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ARTICLE 
REDISTRICTING AND THE TERRITORIAL COMMUNITY 
NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS† 
As the current redistricting cycle unfolds, the courts are stuck in limbo.  The 
Supreme Court has held unanimously that political gerrymandering can be un-
constitutional—but it has also rejected every standard suggested to date for dis-
tinguishing lawful from unlawful district plans.  This Article offers a way out 
of the impasse.  It proposes that courts resolve gerrymandering disputes by exam-
ining how well districts correspond to organic geographic communities.  Dis-
tricts ought to be upheld when they coincide with such communities, but struck 
down when they unnecessarily disrupt them. 
This approach, which I call the “territorial community test,” has a robust 
theoretical pedigree.  In fact, the proposition that communities develop geograph-
ically and require legislative representation has won wide acceptance for most of 
American history.  The courts have also employed variants of the test (without 
scholars previously having noticed) in several related fields:  reapportionment, 
racial gerrymandering, racial vote dilution, etc.  The principle of district-
community congruence thus animates much of the relevant case law already.  
The test is largely unscathed, furthermore, by the unmanageability critique that 
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has doomed every other potential redistricting standard.  The courts have shown 
for decades that they can compare district and community boundaries, and the 
social science literature confirms the feasibility of such comparisons.  Finally, the 
political implications of the test’s adoption would likely be positive.  My empiri-
cal analysis suggests that partisan bias would decrease, relative to the status 
quo, while electoral responsiveness and voter participation would rise. 
It is true that the territorial community test does not directly address parti-
san motives or outcomes.  But the Court has made clear that it views these issues 
as doctrinal dead ends.  Ironically, the only way left to combat gerrymandering 
might be to strike at something other than its heart. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The decennial bloodsport of redistricting is now underway.  Across 
America, state legislatures are busy drawing new electoral district lines 
based on the results of the 2010 Census.  These new district lines, of 
course, will produce both winners and losers.  Some political parties 
will gain seats while others will lose them.  Some incumbents will have 
their districts fortified while others will be thrown to the wolves.  Some 
minority groups will be able to elect the candidates of their choice 
while others will be engulfed by the surrounding majority.  
In typical American fashion, many of the losers of the redistricting 
wars are seeking redress in court.1  For better or worse, the doctrine 
that governs most of their claims—unequal district population, racial 
vote dilution, racial gerrymandering, retrogression, etc.—is relatively 
clear.  But in one crucial area, that of political gerrymandering,2 the 
case law is in chaos, at the levels of both theory and practice.  The rele-
vant scholarly literature is less confused but equally fragmented.  
 
1 For more on the ongoing litigation over electoral district lines since the 2010 
Census, see Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).     
2 Political gerrymandering is usually defined as the drawing of electoral districts in 
order (1) to advance one major party’s interests at the other’s expense or (2) to protect 
the incumbents of both parties.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (plural-
ity opinion) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999)).  While not quarrel-
ing with this definition, this Article also conceives of political gerrymandering in a third 
way:  as the drawing of district lines in such a way that organic territorial communities 
are disrupted.  Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 177 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in the result in part) (“The problem of the gerrymander is 
how to defeat or circumvent the sentiments of the community.”). 
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There is thus an urgent doctrinal and academic need for new ideas, as 
well as for some coherence where now there is mostly upheaval.  The 
“territorial community test” that this Article introduces is an attempt 
to meet that need. 
A generation ago, in Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a cause of action for political gerrymandering for the first time.3  
However, the standard the plurality announced, focusing on the “con-
sistent[] degrad[ation] . . . of voters’ influence on the political process 
as a whole,”4 proved hopelessly unworkable.  Scholars puzzled over what 
values the standard sought to capture,5 while lower courts struggled to 
apply it in actual cases.6  A few years ago, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court 
tackled gerrymandering again, with even worse results.  A plurality 
would have reversed Bandemer and declared the whole field nonjustici-
able.7  Three dissents proposed separate (and conflicting) approaches 
for determining when gerrymanders cross the constitutional line.8  As 
for Justice Kennedy, ever the Court’s agonist, he was unpersuaded by 
the plurality, but also unpersuaded by any of the dissents, leaving him 
(and us) in a limbo where a standard for identifying unlawful gerry-
manders might exist but has yet to be discovered.9 
 
3 478 U.S. 109, 113, 125 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
4 Id. at 132. 
5 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:  The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1993) (“Bandemer is a mass of confusion on 
what the Court actually believes is the constitutional harm.”); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, 
Bandemer’s Gap:  Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
AND THE COURTS 64, 74-77 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
6 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282 (plurality opinion) (“In the lower courts, the legacy of the 
plurality’s test [in Bandemer] is one long record of puzzlement and consternation.”).  
7 See id. at 305-06. 
8 See id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing inquiry focused on partisan in-
tent); id. at 346-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing burden-shifting approach im-
ported from employment discrimination context); id. at 360-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing risk of “unjustified entrenchment” by political minority). 
9 See id. at 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  In the subsequent 
case of League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, the Court explicitly 
declined to answer any of the questions left hanging by Vieth.  See 548 U.S. 399, 414 
(2006) (“We do not revisit [Vieth’s] justiciability holding . . . .”).  Unsurprisingly, the 
scholarly response to Vieth has been sharply negative.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defin-
ing the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
397, 399 (2005); James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerryman-
dering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 643 (2004) (noting that “[t]he result [in Vieth] was 
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In the literature, as one might expect, potential approaches 
abound for resolving political gerrymandering disputes.  One im-
portant camp, led by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, argues 
that courts should emphasize electoral competition and intervene 
when districts are deliberately drawn to be uncompetitive.10  Political 
scientists such as Andrew Gelman, Bernard Grofman, and Gary King 
have devised quantitative measures that show how fairly (or unfairly) a 
given district plan treats the two major parties.11  Other scholars con-
tend that the judicial inquiry should center on partisan intent,12 dis-
trict compactness,13 the loss of democratic legitimacy,14 or a series of 
 
disappointing” and “left the law a shambles”); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political 
Thicket:  The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 528 
(2004) (“[T]he Court at this moment seems to be at sea when deciding election law 
cases.”); Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places):  Partisan Gerry-
mandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 627-28, 642 (2004); Daniel H. Low-
enstein, Vieth’s Gap:  Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan 
Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368, 393-94 (2005). 
10 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 615-17 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?:  
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 570-74 (2004); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 680-81 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Polit-
ical Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 262-63 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Sys-
tems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 517-21 (1994); Bernard Grofman & 
Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering 
After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6-9 (2007); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship 
Between Votes and Seats:  The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
185, 195-200 (1985). 
12 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 825-
28 (2005); Briffault, supra note 9, at 416. 
13 See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compact-
ness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1176-78 
(1990); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:  Compactness as a Pro-
cedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 302, 326-
51 (1991); cf. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” 
and Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 483, 536 (1993) (analyzing racial gerrymandering doctrine in compactness terms). 
14 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 
607-16 (2007). 
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factors derived from traditional districting criteria.15  Still other schol-
ars assert that gerrymandering is not particularly harmful and should 
not be dealt with by the courts at all.16 
As voluminous as this literature is, much of it favors approaches 
that already have been spurned by the Court or that are in tension 
with the principles underlying the American electoral system.  For in-
stance, an outright majority of the Vieth Court rejected Justice Stevens’s 
partisan-intent standard, Justice Souter’s five-part test based on tradi-
tional districting criteria, and Justice Breyer’s minority-entrenchment 
approach.17  Nor, despite repeated invitations, has the Court ever em-
braced competition as the linchpin of its election law jurisprudence; 
indeed, even one of the dissenters in Vieth declined to adopt “[t]he 
analogy to antitrust.”18  A competition-centered approach also would 
be difficult to reconcile with the American commitment to geographic 
districting, which intrinsically produces many uncompetitive constitu-
encies.  Similarly, quantitative measures of partisan fairness have been 
appraised skeptically by the Court,19 and have limited relevance for a 
districting regime that is organized around localized constituencies 
rather than statewide seat and vote tallies. 
In this Article, I present an approach for curbing political gerry-
mandering that promises to avoid some of these pitfalls.  The ap-
proach, in brief, is that electoral districts should be required to 
 
15 See, e.g., Gordon E. Baker, The “Totality of Circumstances” Approach, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 203, 205-10; Bernard Grofman, 
Criteria for Districting:  A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 171-72 (1985). 
16 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563, 577-78 
(1989); Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering:  A Comment 
on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein & 
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest:  Elusive or 
Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 73-75 (1985); Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 679-81 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:  Partisan 
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1330, 1384 
(1987). 
17 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292-301 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 308 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with plurality’s criticisms of dis-
senters’ proposed standards); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138-43 (1986) 
(plurality opinion) (rejecting Justice Powell’s totality-of-circumstances approach). 
18 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 350 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
19 See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
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correspond to underlying territorial communities.  To the extent pos-
sible, the boundaries of districts and organic geographic communities 
should be required to coincide—and the courts should be prepared to 
intervene when communities are unnecessarily fused, fragmented, or 
subverted, and the state can offer no reasonable explanation for the 
communal disruption. 
A few points of clarification:  First, by “territorial community,” I 
mean (1) a geographically defined group of people who (2) share sim-
ilar social, cultural, and economic interests and (3) believe they are 
part of the same coherent entity.  Under this definition, territorial 
communities sometimes, but not always, mirror political subdivisions 
such as towns and counties.  Territorial communities also are not quite 
the same thing as “communities of interest” (a common term in the 
redistricting case law), which are not necessarily geographically rooted 
and can form on the basis of any shared concern.  Rather, territorial 
communities arise from the unique combinations of geography, inter-
ests, and identity that characterize particular places. 
Second, district and community boundaries should coincide “to 
the extent possible” because the one-person, one-vote rule makes per-
fect congruence impossible.  When communities must be disrupted, 
however, the disruption should be minimized—for instance, by joining 
groups that are as similar in their interests and affiliations as is practi-
cable.  Third, “fusion” and “fragmentation” refer, respectively, to the 
unnecessary merger of disparate communities and division of unified 
communities.  By “subversion,” I mean the drawing of districts that 
diverge sharply from the defining characteristics of the larger com-
munities in which they are located. 
Lastly, when I say that the judiciary should be ready to “intervene,” 
I primarily have in mind constitutional law as the source of the courts’ 
authority.  But the power could, of course, be derived from other well-
springs, too:  an act of Congress, state legislation, or, as I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, popular initiatives and referenda.20  I also do not 
claim that adherence to community boundaries should be the sole crite-
rion for determining whether a district plan is valid.  My goal here is to 
 
20 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting:  Why Popular Initiatives to Es-
tablish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 332-37 (2007). 
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call attention to an intriguing but underdeveloped doctrinal possibil-
ity—not to steal the thunder of other methods for combating gerry-
mandering.  
Little in law is ever entirely new, but this territorial community test 
clearly runs against the grain of contemporary scholarship.  In three 
recent articles, for example, Richard Briffault, Richard Hasen, and 
Richard Pildes list an array of potential standards for political gerry-
mandering cases, but do not even mention adherence to community 
boundaries as a possibility.21  When scholars have addressed the territor-
ial community, they typically have done so in cursory fashion22 and with 
a hint of dismissiveness.23  As John Hart Ely once wrote, “‘[C]ommunity’ 
is a concept so squishy that we should hesitate to entrust its specific ap-
plication to either judges or politicians . . . .”24  Just about the only aca-
demics to delve into the subject at any length are Bernard Grofman 
(who suggests that districts should be “cognizable” to voters),25 Henry 
Chambers (who advocates “enclave districting”),26 and James Gardner 
(who has researched state law on communities of interest).27 
 
21 See Briffault, supra note 9, at 418-21; Hasen, supra note 9, at 637-39; Richard H. 
Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword:  The Constitutionalization of Democratic 
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 66 (2004). 
22 See, e.g., JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND:  COURTS, LEGISLA-
TURES, & REDISTRICTING 204 (2003); BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 
63-66 (1984); Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution:  Into the Thorns of the 
Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 215-16; Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a 
Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra 
note 5, at 145, 153; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 577. 
23 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 607, 616 (1998); Richard L. Engstrom, The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting:  An 
Entangled Thicket Within the Federal System, PUBLIUS, Fall 2002, at 51, 66-67; Lowenstein & 
Steinberg, supra note 16, at 32-33; Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies:  A 
Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1160-61 (2005). 
24 Ely, supra note 23, at 616 (emphasis omitted). 
25 See Grofman, supra note 15, at 90; Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have 
Been Right if He Had Said:  “When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only 
Thing”?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1262-63 (1993).  
26 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135, 
176-82 (1999). 
27 See James A. Gardner, Foreword:  Representation Without Party:  Lessons from State 
Constitutional Attempts To Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 894-97 (2006) 
[hereinafter Gardner, Representation Without Party]; James A. Gardner, One Person, One 
Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1241-46 (2002) [herein-
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The territorial community test thus bucks the academy’s conven-
tional wisdom.  What does it have going for it beyond its contrariness?  
One significant (and previously unnoticed) advantage is that it has 
been employed by the Supreme Court, at least implicitly, in a range of 
recent redistricting decisions.  In the racial gerrymandering context, 
for example, districts that correspond to geographic communities 
universally have been upheld by the Court, while districts that do not 
invariably have been struck down.  The Court’s reasoning is that dis-
tricts coinciding with communities cannot have been crafted primarily 
on the basis of race. 
Similarly, in the realm of racial vote dilution, the Court’s govern-
ing standard asks whether a minority group is “geographically com-
pact” and “politically cohesive”—in other words, whether the group is 
a territorial community.28  In its most prominent recent dilution case, 
the Court both objected to the breakup of an old district that con-
tained a “cohesive and politically active Latino community,” and inval-
idated a new district that “combined two groups of Latinos, hundreds 
of miles apart, that represent different communities.”29  It is notable 
that the author of this decision was Justice Kennedy, the Hamlet of 
Vieth.  That he placed such weight on district-community congruence 
indicates that he may be open to a similar approach in the political 
gerrymandering arena. 
A renewed emphasis on the territorial community also would be 
consistent with the theory and historical practice of American district-
ing.  From colonial times until the reapportionment revolution of the 
1960s, a core premise of American democracy was that communities 
arise on the basis of geography, possess distinctive political interests, 
and require representation in the legislature.  Although this perspec-
tive has become less prevalent over the past two generations, it re-
mains well-regarded among political theorists, and it dovetails nicely 
with the enduring American commitment to geographic districting.  
Consistent with this theory, the practice of most American jurisdic-
 
after Gardner, Possibility of Community]; James A. Gardner, What Is “Fair” Partisan Represen-
tation, and How Can It Be Constitutionalized?  The Case for a Return to Fixed Election Districts, 90 
MARQ. L. REV. 555, 578-82 (2007) [hereinafter Gardner, Fixed Election Districts]. 
28 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
29 LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006). 
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tions, over most of the country’s history, was to base representation at 
least partly on the territorial community.  At the state legislative level, 
the most common constituency until the 1960s consisted of one or 
more towns or counties.  At the federal level, the county was typically 
the building block for the congressional district. 
The classic objection to the territorial community test is that it is 
too difficult to determine where community boundaries are and 
whether they coincide with district lines.30  The absence of “judicially 
discernible and manageable standards,” of course, was the precise rea-
son the Vieth plurality gave for rejecting all of the dissenters’ suggested 
approaches.31  In my view, however, there are several reasons why the 
test would actually be workable.  First, the Court has shown repeatedly, 
in the racial gerrymandering and racial vote dilution contexts, that it 
can identify community boundaries and evaluate district-community 
congruence.  There is no reason why this task would be significantly 
harder in the political gerrymandering context. 
Second, an array of state courts already have done very nearly what I 
propose:  pursuant to state constitutional and statutory provisions, they 
have resolved political gerrymandering disputes based on the degree to 
which districts coincided with underlying communities.  The rich body 
of case law produced by these decisions—which scholars have largely 
ignored—certainly does not seem arbitrary or unprincipled.  Third, po-
litical scientists have developed several quantitative measures that could 
be used to define communities and to assess how well districts corre-
spond to them.  Some measures employ socioeconomic data or people’s 
own geographic affiliations to identify community boundaries.  Other 
techniques gauge the level of congruence between districts and politi-
cal subdivisions or media markets, both of which are decent proxies 
for geographic communities.32 
The second common criticism of the territorial community test is 
that it would have undesirable political consequences.  Skeptics claim 
that it would harm Democrats and racial minorities (who supposedly 
 
30 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
31 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
32 In a sequel to this Article, I use newly available Census data as well as specialized 
mapping software to identify geographic communities directly.  See Nicholas O. Steph-
anopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).   
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live in particularly concentrated communities) and make elections less 
competitive.  Concerns of this sort have limited bearing on the test’s 
legal merit, and they turn out to be empirically unfounded as well.  I 
analyzed how partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, and minority rep-
resentation differed during the last redistricting cycle between states 
that paid heed to community boundaries when they redrew their dis-
trict maps and states that did not.33  I found that bias was markedly lower 
in the community-respecting states (5.4% versus 9.4%), responsiveness 
was markedly higher (1.43 versus 1.03), and minority representation 
was essentially unchanged.  These findings are largely confirmed by an 
extensive political science literature—and suggest that the political 
implications of the territorial community test’s adoption actually 
would be quite positive. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I sets forth the theory of rep-
resentation that justifies drawing electoral districts on the basis of terri-
torial communities.  Part II describes the tumultuous history of the 
territorial community as a factor in redistricting practice and case law.  
Part III considers how the territorial community test might translate 
into doctrine.  Part IV addresses concerns about the test’s judicial 
manageability.  Finally, Part V discusses the likely political conse-
quences of tighter district-community congruence. 
I.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Drawing district lines is no mere clerical task.  To the contrary, the 
way in which districts are delineated has profound implications for the 
public’s engagement with politics, for the character of political repre-
sentation, for electoral competition, and for partisan fairness.  One 
might even say that our democracy itself hinges, to some degree, on 
our system of districting.34  
 
33 Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the share of seats that each party would 
win given the same share of the statewide vote.  Electoral responsiveness refers to the 
rate at which a party gains or loses seats given changes in its statewide vote share.  See 
infra notes 76, 365-67 and accompanying text.  A sequel to this Article also finds that 
the political consequences of tighter district-community congruence are positive.  See 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript at 31-35, 48-51). 
34 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 475-76 (2004) (noting that 
redistricting “raises issues about the purpose and function of the [legislature], the value 
of political competition, and how voters should be represented”). 
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This means that no potential standard for drawing district lines (or 
for thwarting political gerrymandering) can be evaluated properly 
without taking into account its theoretical underpinnings.  On what 
theory of representation is the standard based?  How compelling is this 
theory?  How consistent is it with the American democratic tradition?  
In this Part, I outline the theory—that communities arise along geo-
graphic lines and should be represented in the legislature—in which 
the territorial community test is rooted.  I argue that this theory is plau-
sible on its face and, more importantly, in harmony with the American 
commitment to geographic districting (which I take here as a given).  I 
also contend that other prominent redistricting approaches either lack 
a clear theoretical foundation or proceed from theories that cannot 
easily be reconciled with core premises of American democracy.   
Because this Article is more concerned with doctrinal matters than 
with issues of democratic theory, this Part is relatively succinct.  Still, in 
the realm of redistricting, theory cannot be ignored—and, indeed, 
warrants some discussion at the very outset.35 
A.  The Underlying Theory 
A distinct theory, which I call the theory of communal representa-
tion, underlies the territorial community test.36  The theory makes two 
central claims.  The first is that meaningful communities do in fact 
develop on the basis of geography.  Subjectively, people feel connect-
ed to (and affiliated with) other people who live close to them:  
neighbors, members of the same school district, fellow residents in 
town, other center-city dwellers, folks on this side of the mountains, 
etc.  Of course, powerful bonds can exist between people on opposite 
 
35 See Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 421 (1995) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJOR-
ITY:  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994)) (arguing, in elec-
tion law context, that “[t]he theoretical and the lawyerly are closely intertwined”). 
36 As is evident from the many sources cited in this Section, this theory is not new.  
But even though it is well-established, it is rarely set forth at length, and it is not associ-
ated with any specific thinker.  Accordingly, there is value in clearly presenting the 
theory’s central claims and consequences. 
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corners of the globe, but proximity at least fosters a sense of subjective 
solidarity.37   
Objectively, people who live nearby tend to have common inter-
ests.  They may have similar income levels, educational backgrounds, 
or housing situations.  They may work for the same local employer or 
industry.  They may have moved to the area for related reasons:  the 
prevalence of certain cultural values, the availability of particular lei-
sure pursuits, the presence of ethnic or racial compatriots, etc.  Or 
they may simply care about the effective governance of the place they 
call home.  Either way, the point is that people’s spatial closeness corr-
elates with, and helps generate, shared interests.38  As Gardner puts it, 
“[P]eople who live in close physical proximity inevitably share certain 
kinds of activities, and . . . the bonds created through these shared ac-
tivities give rise to a community . . . that is deeply connected to, built 
upon the matrix of, even induced by, the particular locality in which 
the members live.”39  
The theory’s second claim is that territorial communities should be 
represented as such in the legislature.  They are important enough enti-
ties, capturing interests and values with sufficient political salience, that 
they should serve as the basic building blocks of legislative representa-
tion.  Geographic affinity—not party, race, profession, or any other fac-
 
37 See, e.g., NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR:  POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
AND COMMUNITY 54 (1988); Alfange, supra note 22, at 216 (“Voters do identify with the 
place in which they live, and do have a feeling of sharing concerns with others who live 
in that place . . . .”); Charles H. Backstrom, Problems of Implementing Redistricting (“People 
think of themselves as belonging together in counties in rural areas, in cities or sectors 
of metropolitan areas, and in neighborhoods of central cities.”), in REPRESENTATION AND 
REDISTRICTING ISSUES 43, 47 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982); Harold M. Proshansky 
et al., Place Identity:  Physical World Socialization of the Self (“Individuals do indeed define 
who and what they are in terms of strong affective ties to . . . neighborhood and com-
munity.”), in GIVING PLACES MEANING 87, 91 (Linda Groat ed., 1995).  
38 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 41 (“Many of the most important interests and concerns people have 
relate to . . . their immediate geographic environment.”); Chambers, supra note 26, at 
163 (“[P]eople who live in close proximity share similar political interests . . . .”); Ben-
jamin Forest, Mapping Democracy:  Racial Identity and the Quandary of Political Representa-
tion, 91 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 143, 157 (2001) (“[P]ropinquity is important 
because political interests, preferences, and identity . . . are formed and defined by 
local geographic communities . . . .”). 
39 Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 950. 
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tor—should be the criterion on the basis of which people are placed 
into electoral districts.  As Justice Stewart once wrote, elected officials 
represent “people with identifiable needs and interests . . . which can 
often be related to the geographical areas in which these people live.”40  
The significance of these “geographical areas”—territorial communities, 
in this Article’s parlance—“carries with it an acceptance of the idea of 
legislative representation of regional needs and interests.”41 
The theory of communal representation also has implications for 
how districts should be constituted and how politicians should repre-
sent their constituents.  First, if districts are drawn to coincide with 
geographic communities, then they should be easily understandable 
by voters—“cognizable,” to use Grofman’s term.42  Voters should be 
less confused and more politically engaged when district boundaries 
also demarcate groups of people with common interests and affilia-
tions.43  Second, districts should be relatively homogeneous in their 
social, cultural, and economic complexions.  When people who share 
key attributes and who feel a kinship with one another are placed into 
the same district, it follows that the district too should possess a com-
paratively uniform texture.44  Not a perfectly uniform texture, since 
 
40 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). 
41 Id.; see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159 (1971) (discussing the “general 
preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible”); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623-24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[L]egislators 
can represent their electors only by speaking for their interests . . . many of which do 
reflect the place where the electors live.”); Briffault, supra note 35, at 431 (“[P]lace-
based interests are the ones that ought to be guaranteed representation in the legisla-
ture.”); Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 574 (“[T]he interests that 
ought to be represented in the legislature are those that are held in common by people 
living in a particular place.”); C.O. Sauer, Geography and the Gerrymander, 12 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 403, 404-05 (1918). 
42 Grofman, supra note 25, at 1262-63. 
43 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 173 n.13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Confusion inevitably follows . . . when a citizen finds 
himself or herself forced to associate with several artificial communities . . . .”); BUCH-
MAN, supra note 22, at 203 (“Plans that do not split [community] boundaries ostensibly 
help voters identify their representatives, and vice versa.”); Martin Shapiro, Gerrymander-
ing, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 243 (1985). 
44 See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 22, at 64 (“The argument that districts should not divide 
communities . . . is in effect a plea for homogeneous districts.”); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., 
HOME STYLE:  HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 6 (1978) (“[T]he most homogene-
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there is often substantial diversity even within a single community,45 
but certainly a more consistent profile than a district that fuses together 
unrelated groups of people. 
Third, because of this homogeneity, it should be relatively straight-
forward for elected officials to identify and advance their districts’ in-
terests.  Representatives should be able fairly easily to become 
“acquainted with the interests and circumstances of [their] constitu-
ents”—as Madison put it in The Federalist—when those traits are broadly 
similar.46  In contrast, heterogeneous districts should pose a greater 
representational challenge since they make it trickier both to discern 
districts’ needs and to satisfy them effectively.47  Fourth, elected offi-
cials should tend toward the delegate side of the delegate-trustee spec-
trum of representation.48  Given coherent constituencies with distinct 
interests, it should be simpler (and more electorally beneficial) for 
officials to promote those interests than to exercise their own inde-
pendent discretion.49 
 
ous districts . . . incorporate pre-existing communities of interest.”); Richard Morrill, A 
Geographer’s Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 5, 
at 212, 216. 
45 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 54 (“[C]ommunity . . . need not necessarily[] 
mean ‘demographic homogeneity,’ sameness of social situation.”). 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 346 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also MALCOLM E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 115 (1982) (“In a 
district that is basically homogeneous . . . the task of representation is relatively easy.”); 
Chambers, supra note 26, at 149 (“A representative can most easily advance the inter-
ests of her constituency when those interests are clearly or narrowly defined.”).   
47 See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 787 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“A 
legislator cannot represent his constituents properly . . . when a voting district is noth-
ing more than an artificial unit . . . .”); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (“To be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a dis-
trict that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests . . . .”); CAIN, supra note 
22, at 63-64; Chambers, supra note 26, at 149; Morrill, supra note 44, at 216. 
48 According to the traditional delegate-trustee dichotomy, representatives who are 
delegates abide by the expressed preferences of their constituents, while representa-
tives who are trustees make their own autonomous policy decisions.  See generally HANNA 
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144-67 (1967). 
49 See, e.g., DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING:  COM-
PARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 71 (1992) (“[A] communities of interest 
approach necessarily implies a delegate theory of representation.”); ROYCE HANSON, 
THE POLITICAL THICKET:  REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 130-31 
(1966); SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 135; Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra 
note 27, at 955-60. 
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The theory’s final implication is that, while districts should be rela-
tively homogeneous, the legislature should be relatively heterogene-
ous.50  With each community in the state (or nation) represented, the 
legislature should reflect the full diversity of views held by the general 
population—not just the preferences of the median voter.  As John 
Adams famously wrote, the legislature “should be an exact portrait, in 
miniature, of the people at large.”51  On this view, legislative politics 
should be inherently pluralistic, as varied communities jockey for posi-
tion and negotiate over the formulation of public policy.  Legislative 
politics also should be less dominated by partisan cleavages, since party 
affiliation presumably has lower salience in a system in which politi-
cians identify strongly with entities (i.e., territorial communities) other 
than political parties. 
On balance, I find the theory’s two key claims—that territorial 
communities exist and should be represented in the legislature—at 
least plausible.  While some politically salient interests do not correlate 
with geography, many others plainly do, and it is sensible, in my view, 
to capture these territorial concerns and assure them a legislative hear-
ing.  I also think the theory’s implications for districting and represen-
tation are relatively attractive.  It does seem desirable for voters to be 
able to make sense of their districts’ boundaries, for representatives to 
be able to identify and promote their constituents’ interests, and for 
legislatures to reflect accurately the diverse views of the public.  In an 
 
50 Heather Gerken has labeled this pattern of intra-district homogeneity and inter-
district heterogeneity as “second-order diversity.”  Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Di-
versity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1107-08 (2005).  Of course, even under this approach, 
only views that are held by sufficiently large and geographically defined groups of peo-
ple will be represented in the legislature. 
51 Letter from John Adams to John Penn ( Jan. 1776), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 
OF JOHN ADAMS 491, 493 (George W. Carey ed., 2000); see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth 
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing for “effective 
representation in the State’s legislature . . . of the various groups and interests making 
up the electorate”); J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 184 (1966) (“[T]he representative Assembly must be 
merely a small-scale replica of the whole people, drawn directly from it and reproduc-
ing it without the slightest distortion.”); Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr:  Politics in Search of 
Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 277 (“[T]he general interest, and the innumerable sepa-
rate interests of which it is composed, will be better expressed in a medley of voices 
from minor fractions of the population than by any monolithic majority.”). 
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era riven by partisanship, it is also hard to quarrel with an approach 
that might weaken the grip of political parties. 
Much more could be said, of course, about the theory of commu-
nal representation.  In this Article, however, I am less interested in 
fleshing out the theory than in pointing out that it is consistent with—
and arguably compelled by—the American commitment to geographic 
districting.  This commitment, as many scholars have noted (often in 
frustration), is ironclad52 and dates all the way back to the Framing.53  
With very few exceptions, American jurisdictions have always elected 
representatives from geographically defined constituencies.  At times, 
jurisdictions have used at-large elections, multimember districts, and 
even voting rules other than first-past-the-post, but almost always in the 
context of districts that were spatially demarcated.  There are also no 
signs that this practice is likely to change anytime soon.  As Peter 
Schuck has observed, geographic districting “remains a firmly embed-
ded feature of American political life, one that reformers’ criticisms 
have utterly failed to dislodge.”54 
Given the premise of geographic districting (which this Article does 
not challenge55), the theory that territorial communities should be rep-
 
52 See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:  THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41-43 (1988); ANNE PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING 
DEMOCRACY 63 (1991) (discussing “near universal practice of electing representatives 
according to geographical constituencies”); ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CON-
STITUENCY:  POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN 56 (2005) (“[T]erritorial districting in the United States is such a habit of mind 
that it is not seriously challenged . . . .”); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-
Conscious Districting:  A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1603-05 (1993); 
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 483 (noting “long-standing Anglo-American commit-
ment to organizing political representation around geography”). 
53 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at 307 n.29 (“[T]he Founders valued the 
faction-diluting character of representation by place. . . . [T]he authors of the Consti-
tution deliberately chose geographical representation.”); James Thomas Tucker, Rede-
fining American Democracy:  Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of 
“Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 369 (2002) (“[T]he Constitutional Framers 
intended that Representatives be elected from [geographic] districts.”). 
54 Schuck, supra note 16, at 1360. 
55 I agree with many of the critiques of geographic districting:  that people’s inter-
ests are often non-territorial, that it can produce unfair electoral outcomes (especially in 
combination with plurality voting and single-member districts), that other systems are 
better at reflecting the public’s views, etc.  In this Article, however, I take geographic 
districting as a given.  My goal here is only to explore how political gerrymandering can 
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resented in the legislature follows fairly naturally.  If district lines are to 
be drawn on the basis of geography, those lines must correspond to 
something, and there are few candidates for what that something should 
be other than people’s territorially linked interests and affiliations.  Cer-
tainly, it would not be sensible to draw spatial boundaries at random, or 
in order to create pretty shapes on a map, or to unite people who have 
no geographic connection to one another.  Districting based on geo-
graphy (rather than party, race, profession, or any of the other myriad 
possibilities) entails districting based on the value that geography is 
meant to capture.  And that value is adherence to the territorial com-
munity—and it is hard to see how it could be anything else.  In the 
words of one political theorist, “[T]he claim for geographic [district-
ing] . . . usu-ally rests . . . on some concept of community, on the rela-
tionships among people living in relative proximity to one another.”56 
There is a lively academic debate as to whether territorial commu-
nities are as meaningful today as they once were.  Some scholars assert 
that advances in transportation and telecommunications, combined 
with the public’s greater mobility and social fluidity, have undermined 
all geographic groupings.57  In contrast, other observers contend that 
people continue to have a “deep concern for [their] locality or region” 
and a “fundamental desire . . . for a sense of place, [for] belonging to 
 
be curbed in a manner consistent with the practice and underlying theory of geographic 
districting.  The debate over geographic districting itself I leave for another day. 
56 ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 52 (1984); see also BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 197 
(discussing “the assumed linkage between geography and politically salient interests 
that conceptually underpins a reliance on district-based elections”); Gardner, Fixed 
Election Districts, supra note 27, at 584 (“[T]erritorial representation . . . must rest on the 
fact that the residents of represented territories comprise distinct and coherent local 
communities . . . .”); Guinier, supra note 52, at 1610-12; Timothy G. O’Rourke, Shaw v. 
Reno:  The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 770 (1995) (“[T]he commit-
ment to geographic districting requires . . . the creation of districts that . . . constitute 
identifiable constituencies.”). 
I can think of one value other than adherence to the territorial community that 
geographic districting might plausibly aim to capture:  administrability.  But while geo-
graphically demarcated districts are indeed easily administrable, so too are non-spatial 
districts, particularly given the rise of modern information technology.  
57 See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 160; MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, 
AND MEMORY:  MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 
73 (1998); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:  Drawing 
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 637 (1993); Gardner, Pos-
sibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1261-62. 
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a community.”58  On this account, recent developments have not under-
cut territorial communities, but rather increased their appeal for the 
atomized inhabitants of the modern world. 
This Article is not the place for me to venture into this controversy.  
My claim, rather, is that whether or not the importance of territorial 
communities has waned, they ought to remain the focus of districting 
as long as it is carried out geographically.  If territorial communities 
indeed no longer matter to people, then perhaps it is time for America 
to abandon geographic districting.  But as long as districts continue to 
be drawn along spatial lines, I see no theoretically justifiable alterna-
tive to drawing them to correspond to territorial communities (weak-
ened though they may be).  Territorial communities remain the only 
game in town. 
B.  Other Approaches 
There are, of course, many possible ways to combat political gerry-
mandering other than by requiring district-community congruence.  
To cite some of the most prominent options, traditional districting 
criteria such as compactness could be enforced more stringently, highly 
uncompetitive districts could be invalidated, or statewide measures of 
partisan fairness could be applied.59  There is much to like about these 
approaches, and any of them would represent a marked improvement 
over the status quo.  Here, though, I am interested in evaluating the 
theoretical underpinnings of redistricting standards.  And on this cri-
terion, none of the above options is entirely satisfying.  The first lacks a 
clear theoretical foundation, while the others are based on theories 
 
58 RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 63 
(1981); see also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT:  WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED 
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 5 (2008) (arguing that Americans now “cluster[] in 
communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the 
end, politics”); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 843, 914 (1999) (“Even in the highly urban, industrialized and culturally polyglot 
societies of the Western capitalist democracies, the assertion of organic cultural com-
munity is appealing.”); David B. Knight, Identity and Territory:  Geographical Perspectives on 
Nationalism and Regionalism, 72 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 514, 526 (1982). 
59 See Briffault, supra note 9, at 400-02 (listing possible gerrymandering standards); 
Hasen, supra note 9, at 637-39 (same); Pildes, supra note 21, at 66-74 (same). 
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that are not easy to square with basic assumptions of the American 
electoral system. 
1.  Compactness 
Beginning with compactness, there is no reason to think that peo-
ple are represented adequately only when they are placed in districts 
whose shapes are aesthetically pleasing.  No theory holds that people’s 
engagement with the political process, the relationships between con-
stituents and their elected officials, or politicians’ performance in of-
fice, is optimal in a regime where districts are compact.  Neither the 
jaggedness of districts’ boundaries, nor the dispersion of their territor-
ies,60 has any inherent connection to the caliber of districts’ political 
life.  As Robert Dixon has noted, “Shape requirements focus on form 
rather than the substance of effective political representation.”61 
Claims are occasionally advanced that compact districts facilitate 
communication between constituents and representatives, improve 
voters’ knowledge of elected officials, or convey political legitimacy.62  
But it should be obvious that compactness itself does not necessarily 
produce these benefits.  A district may be a perfect circle, but have a 
mountain range running down the middle of it, or combine two towns 
with nothing in common.63  In these (and many other) cases, attractive 
 
60 The regularity of a district’s perimeter and the dispersion of a district’s area are 
two well-established measures of compactness.  See BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 200; 
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 554-56. 
61 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, 
in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 37, at 7, 16; see also Shaw v. 
Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 936 n.13 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (positing that 
voters’ “interest in being in a district whose members share similar interests and con-
cerns . . . often is not[] vindicated by drawing districts with attractive shapes”); MARK 
MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES:  HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELEC-
TRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 71 (2001); Grofman, supra note 15, 
at 89-90 (“[T]he usefulness of requiring that districts be compact has been vastly over-
rated.”); Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1693 (noting “absence of an independent norma-
tive foundation for a compactness requirement”). 
62 See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 198; BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 49, at 72-73; 
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 538 n.177. 
63 See Persily, supra note 23, at 1158 (“One could draw compact districts that group 
unrelated communities on different sides of a mountain or river . . . .”).  Conversely, non-
compact districts may sometimes correspond to territorial communities and be cognizable 
to voters.  See Briffault, supra note 38, at 44 n.104; Grofman, supra note 25, at 1263. 
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district shape is not correlated with good communication, high voter 
knowledge, or enhanced legitimacy.  Moreover, when compactness is 
correlated with these attributes, it is often because the compact district 
corresponds to a compact territorial community.  Within a community, 
of course, it is relatively easy for voters and elected officials to com-
municate and for constituents to inform themselves about their repre-
sentatives.  Districts that reflect underlying communities are also 
usually perceived as politically legitimate.  Accordingly, there is no 
theoretical basis for focusing on compact districts—whose principal 
appeal is that they are weak proxies for territorial communities—
instead of on the communities themselves.64 
2.  Competition 
 As compactness has lost some of its luster in recent years, scholars 
have turned their attention to the argument (most associated with Issa-
charoff and Pildes) that courts should prioritize structural values in 
election law cases, electoral competition chief among them.65  In the 
redistricting context, this argument means that highly uncompetitive 
districts should be invalidated (or at least regarded with severe skepti-
cism), particularly when the lack of competition is deliberate.66  As its 
advocates make clear, a particular theory of democracy underlies this 
approach.  “[D]emocratic politics [is] akin in important respects to a 
robustly competitive market . . . . Only through an appropriately com-
 
64 See Grofman, supra note 15, at 92 (arguing that compactness is “a useful criterion 
only to the extent that it happens to coincide with other features”); Pildes & Niemi, 
supra note 13, at 538 (“[C]ompactness might be associated with relevant substantive 
districting values, like preserving communities that shared common political interests, 
but . . . compactness [is] a poor proxy for those values.”).  The other common argu-
ment for compactness is instrumental:  imposing an additional constraint on line-
drawers makes it more difficult for them to pursue partisan advantage or incumbent 
protection.  See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at 332 (“[W]here compactness is a 
constraint, a gerrymanderer’s job is noticeably harder.”).  This argument plainly is not 
based on any theory of representation.  Moreover, there is reason to doubt that com-
pactness is a meaningful constraint for redistricters, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra 
note 16, at 22-23, and similar indirect limitations can be imposed in other ways—such 
as through adherence to territorial communities.   
65 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 620 (arguing that bipartisan gerrymanders 
should be presumptively invalid); Pildes, supra note 10, at 271-76. 
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petitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of demo-
cratic politics be realized:  that the policy outcomes of the political 
process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”67  In other 
words, competition is the essence of democracy, because it is only 
through competition that the government becomes responsive and 
accountable to voters. 
This is a compelling conception, and it has significant (and largely 
positive) implications for how courts should tackle an array of election 
law controversies.68  In the redistricting realm, though, the theory runs 
into some difficulty.  The problem that is particularly relevant here 
(and that has received little attention in the literature) is the tension 
between the theory and the American commitment to geographic dis-
tricting.  Different geographic areas, of course, have different political 
profiles.  In some areas (e.g., blue-collar ethnic communities, certain 
suburbs), the two major parties enjoy similar levels of support.  But in 
other areas (e.g., rural farmland, urban centers), one party is far more 
popular than the other.  In this latter category of places, it is extremely 
difficult to design competitive districts.  Any district that accurately 
reflects the area’s politics inevitably will be safe for one party or another.  
The only way to create a swing district is to fuse part of one area (a 
center city, say) with part of another (for instance, a faraway farming 
community).69 
The conflict between the competition-centered approach and geo-
graphic districting thus arises because many geographic areas simply 
are not politically competitive.  In these areas, either uncompetitive 
 
67 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 646; see also Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 
623 (“[D]emocracy is defined primarily by the accountability of the elected to the elec-
tors, an accountability that is in turn shaped through competitive elections.”); Richard 
H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 688 
(2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)). 
68 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 652-87 (applying competition-
centered approach to White Primary Cases, write-in ballots, and fusion candidacies); 
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1613-15 (1999) 
(applying approach to threshold vote requirements for parties in proportional repre-
sentation systems). 
69 See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. 
CT. REV. 409, 425 (2004) (“[I]n places where there are . . . politically homogeneous 
groups of voters, there may be no reasonable redistricting arrangement that is capable 
of . . . produc[ing] competitive general elections.”). 
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districts must be drawn—despite the harms that allegedly ensue for 
democratic responsiveness and accountability—or competitive districts 
must be created by connecting groups of people with little in com-
mon.  Surprisingly, advocates of the competition-centered approach 
do not appear to favor the latter option.  Samuel Issacharoff and Pam-
ela Karlan write that “[t]here will always be Berkeley and Orange 
County,” where “[i]t would take a radical gerrymander . . . to bring 
them to a contested balance between the major parties.”70  Richard 
Pildes similarly distinguishes between “safe districts that arise naturally” 
and “safe districts that arise because political insiders have grossly mani-
pulated district designs.”71   
But if competitiveness can be sacrificed wherever it does not de-
velop organically, then the competition-centered approach is not all 
that different from this Article’s call for district-community congru-
ence.  In that case, both approaches recommend competitive districts 
where the broader community is competitive, and uncompetitive dis-
tricts where the broader community is uncompetitive.  Likewise, both 
approaches condemn uncompetitive districts that are drawn within a 
competitive community—on one account because responsiveness and 
accountability are needlessly undermined, and on the other because a 
coherent community is needlessly disrupted.   
This may seem like an elegant theoretical convergence, but it is ac-
tually more akin to a surrender.  The logical implication of the compe-
tition-centered approach is that competitive districts indeed should be 
drawn, where necessary, by merging disparate communities.  By resist-
ing this implication, the approach’s proponents concede that the 
principle of adherence to territorial communities takes precedence 
over their desire for competitive districts.  They concede (to quote Issa-
charoff and Karlan) that “there is . . . normative force to the idea that 
districts should reflect some reality on the ground.”72 
 
70 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 574; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply, 
Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (2002) (“There will always be a Utah and a 
Massachusetts.  The question is not whether districts should be homogenized . . . but 
whether districts may be rigged so as to diminish or eliminate competition that would 
otherwise emerge . . . .”). 
71 Pildes, supra note 10, at 266. 
72 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 552. 
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If advocates of the competition-centered approach did not make 
this concession—that is, if they insisted on competitive districts under 
all circumstances—then their goals would be met most readily by non-
territorial constituencies.73  Districts defined by their balanced partisan 
composition (rather than by their spatial boundaries) are the obvious 
way to maximize electoral competitiveness.  But even if such a district-
ing regime were attractive in the abstract,74 it would bear little resem-
blance to our actual system.  We would have to renounce our 
commitment to territoriality in order to optimize political competi-
tion, because geographic districts cannot fully accommodate non-
geographic values.75 
3.  Partisan Fairness 
The final approach that is often recommended for curbing politi-
cal gerrymandering is some quantitative measure of partisan fairness.  
For instance, the partisan symmetry test (the most sophisticated of these 
measures) focuses on whether each major party would win the same 
share of seats given a particular share of the statewide vote.  The dis-
junction, if any, between the seat shares—e.g., if Democrats would win 
sixty percent of the seats if they received fifty percent of the votes, but 
Republicans would win sixty-five percent of the seats with that vote 
share—constitutes the partisan asymmetry.76  The theory underlying 
 
73 See, e.g., REHFELD, supra note 52, at 177 (endorsing non-territorial districts that 
each resemble the nation as a whole); Pamela S. Karlan, A Bigger Picture (commenting 
that since “many citizens’ most pressing interests . . . are not primarily defined by where 
they live . . . we probably would pick a different system if we were starting from scratch”), 
in REFLECTING ALL OF US:  THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 73, 74-76 
( Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999). 
74 For a powerful critique of such a regime, see generally Persily, supra note 16. 
75 See Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 572-73 (“[P]artisan competi-
tion and territorial districting . . . are conflicting and indeed incommensurable princi-
ples upon which to base a system of legislative representation.”); cf. Michael P. 
McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts (noting that in Arizona, where competi-
tiveness is a redistricting criterion, competitive districts often can be drawn only by 
“placing dissimilar communities together”), in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY:  
ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 222, 239 (Michael P. McDonald & 
John Samples eds., 2006). 
76 See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 6-9.  A cruder approach would simply ask 
whether a party receives the same share of seats and votes.  This is another way of asking 
whether representation is proportional—clearly a value that is inconsistent with geo-
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this approach is clear:  “[T]he electoral system [should] treat similarly-
situated parties equally,”77 so that “candidates of each political par-
ty . . . have equal opportunity in translating voter support into the divi-
sion of legislative seats between the parties.”78 
This theory too is appealing in principle but difficult to square 
with the practice of geographic districting.  Given the different politi-
cal profiles of different areas, there is little reason to think that dis-
tricts drawn on the basis of geographic considerations will typically 
yield the same results for both major parties.  For example, one party’s 
support in a state might be heavily concentrated while the other party’s 
backers are more evenly (and effectively) dispersed.  In this case, the 
parties would not win the same share of seats given a particular share 
of the statewide vote—at least not as long as districts are drawn on the 
basis of the usual redistricting criteria.79  It might be possible to devise 
districts that ensure partisan symmetry in such a state, but these dis-
tricts would likely form strange shapes and pay little heed to subdivi-
sion or community boundaries.80  If constituencies are to be defined 
not just spatially, but also in accordance with underlying geographic 
realities, then partisan symmetry cannot be guaranteed.81  Indeed, the 
best way to ensure symmetry is to adopt a non-territorial electoral sys-
 
graphic districting.  See Alfange, supra note 22, at 221-22; Schuck, supra note 16, at 1361-
77. 
77 Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 6.   
78 Id. at 8.   
79 See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The existence 
or degree of asymmetry may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible 
vote-switchers will reside.”); CAIN, supra note 22, at 75 (“If there are enclaves of ho-
mogeneous support for one or the other party, then it will be necessary to distinguish 
between partisan inefficiency caused by residential segregation and that caused by 
redistricting per se.”). 
80 See Alfange, supra note 22, at 223 (“To achieve [partisan symmetry] in a districting 
system, it would probably be necessary to engage in a process of reverse gerrymandering, 
creating meandering districts that violate the compactness criterion . . . .”); cf. Jenni 
Newton-Farrelly, From Gerry-Built to Purpose-Built:  Drawing Electoral Boundaries for Unbiased 
Election Outcomes, 45 REPRESENTATION 471, 476 (2009) (U.K.) (noting that in South 
Australia, the only jurisdiction in the world with an explicit partisan fairness require-
ment, “geographic districts . . . [are] split where required by fairness or equity”). 
81 See Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 576 (“[O]ur ability to achieve 
fair partisan representation is consistently thwarted by our commitment to territorial 
representation.”); Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 29 (conceding that “partisan bias 
[can be] necessitated by the state’s compliance with neutral districting principles”). 
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tem—proportional representation, for instance, which intrinsically 
treats all major parties identically. 
The inherent symmetry of non-territorial regimes points to the 
core problem with applying metrics of partisan fairness to American 
elections:  those metrics look only to statewide shares of seats and votes, 
while the character of geographic districting is irreducibly local.  As 
discussed above, the very reason for drawing geographic districts is to 
capture something unique about each particular place—to enable 
each distinct locality to have its voice heard (and its interests ad-
vanced) in the legislature.82  Under this conception of representation, 
concerns about statewide seats and votes are largely irrelevant.  What 
matters, instead, is that each district make sense (because it corre-
sponds to a territorial community), not that the consolidated votes in 
all the districts across the state bear some relationship to the seats con-
trolled statewide by each party.  As Justice O’Connor once noted, 
“[V]oters cast votes for candidates in their districts, not for a statewide 
slate of legislative candidates . . . . Consequently, efforts to determine 
party voting strength presuppose a norm that does not exist—
statewide elections for representatives along party lines.”83 
Accordingly, the principal alternatives to the territorial community 
test are theoretically problematic.  While preferable to the status quo 
and appealing in many respects, they either lack an appropriate theo-
retical foundation or conflict with the enduring American commit-
ment to geographic districting. 
II.  THE ARC OF HISTORY 
It is not only theory that demands consideration in the redistrict-
ing context.  History, too, has important implications for which ap-
proaches to political gerrymandering can and should be adopted.  
That a particular approach has long been used by many American jur-
isdictions suggests that it fits well with our electoral institutions and 
 
82 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
83 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 159 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also 
Alfange, supra note 22, at 224 (“Individual [district] elections are often intensely per-
sonal matters, turning not in the slightest degree on which party the voter wants to 
control the legislature . . . . It just cannot be assumed that a vote for a particular candi-
date in a particular district is a vote for that candidate’s party statewide.”). 
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values.84  Conversely, there is greater uncertainty associated with stand-
ards that rarely or never have been employed (such as competitiveness 
and partisan fairness).  The ecosystem of election law is intricate, and 
it is difficult to predict what consequences new seedlings might have. 
Accordingly, this Part examines the rich history of the territorial 
community in American redistricting practice and doctrine.  I first dis-
cuss the period prior to the reapportionment revolution, during which 
districts generally corresponded to communities and gerrymandering 
was understood as the absence of such congruence.  I next explain 
how the momentous one-person, one-vote decisions of the 1960s de-
throned the territorial community and replaced it with a single-
minded focus on population equality.  Lastly, in what is this Part’s 
most novel contribution to the literature, I argue that respect for terri-
torial communities has returned to the fore in recent years.  State 
courts often focus on adherence to community boundaries when they 
evaluate district plans, and the Supreme Court’s intuition that districts 
and communities should coincide now animates—and gives coherence 
to—a good deal of its redistricting case law.  Rumors of the territorial 
community’s demise, like Mark Twain’s, seem to have been greatly 
exaggerated. 
A.  Ascendance 
Almost since the inception of Anglo-American democracy, elec-
toral districts and territorial communities usually have coincided.  
More than seven hundred years ago, when England’s House of Com-
mons came into being, it was geographic communities that received 
representation.  Counties, shires, and boroughs all sent delegates to 
inform the monarch of their views and to promote their particular in-
terests.  Because it was distinct localities that were represented, rather 
than the public at large, it was “more accurate to call the representa-
 
84 Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 308 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (expressing interest in learning more about “principles of fair districting 
discussed in the annals of parliamentary or legislative bodies” in order to determine 
“well-accepted rules of fairness that should govern districting”). 
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tive portion of the Parliament a House of Communes than a House of 
Commons.”85 
Colonial America adopted a similar model.  In all thirteen colo-
nies, local communities (such as towns, counties, plantations, and par-
ishes) directly elected representatives to the various assemblies.  
Though more populous communities were sometimes assigned more 
elected officials, representation was always provided to some commu-
nal unit.86  After independence, states continued to organize their pol-
itics around the territorial community.  Their original constitutions all 
designated towns (in New England) or counties (everywhere else) as 
the entities from which representatives were to be elected to the state 
legislature.87  “[T]he basic unit of legislative representation was widely 
understood throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be 
the [town or] county.”88 
As time passed and the country grew, a number of states switched 
from town or county representation to electoral districts drawn rough-
ly on the basis of population.  According to Gardner’s survey of state 
 
85 A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 27 (1971); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 307 
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referring to “the basic English principle of appor-
tioning representatives among the local governmental entities . . . rather than among 
units of approximately equal population”); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
REVOLUTION:  REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 15-16 
(1966); JOHN C. COURTNEY, COMMISSIONED RIDINGS:  DESIGNING CANADA’S ELECTORAL 
DISTRICTS 206 (2001) (“[T]he House of Commons was originally the House of Com-
munitates, the counties and boroughs of England.”); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS 
OF SIZE:  REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1850, at 37 (1987) (“[E]ach 
community sent a designated number of delegates to the House of Commons.”). 
86 See Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1244-45; see also Baker, 369 
U.S. at 307 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that British approach “had early taken 
root in the colonies”); GORDON E. BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 7 
(1955); HOWARD BALL, THE WARREN COURT’S CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY:  AN EVAL-
UATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S APPORTIONMENT OPINIONS 52 (1971); REHFELD, 
supra note 52, at 72-77; Guinier, supra note 52, at 1604-05 (“This link between political 
representation and . . . geographic ties was later carried over to the United States dur-
ing the Colonial period.”); Tucker, supra note 53, at 366-69. 
87 See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:  REAPPORTIONMENT IN 
LAW AND POLITICS 62-63 (1968) (listing apportionment methods of original thirteen 
states); ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 30-31 
(1907).  For their upper houses, about half the states elected senators from individual 
counties, while the other half elected them from districts composed of multiple whole 
counties.  See DIXON, supra, at 62; Tucker, supra note 53, at 367-68. 
88 Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 918. 
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constitutions, this trend took hold at the state senate level around 
1800, and at the state house level around 1850.89  Rosemarie Zagarri 
reports that it was mostly the larger and newer states that switched to 
districted elections in the 1800s.90  Crucially, these state legislative dis-
tricts, unlike their modern analogues, almost never disrupted town or 
county boundaries.  To the contrary, state constitutions frequently 
prohibited districts from dividing political subdivisions, and occasion-
ally defined districts outright as combinations of smaller subunits.91  At 
the federal level too, congressional districts in the 1800s typically were 
composed of whole towns and counties and rarely crossed their 
boundaries.92  In this era, the “principle that local government units 
should be kept intact for purposes of representation” was “almost uni-
versally accepted” for both state and federal elections.93   
This regime endured mostly unchanged through the first half of 
the twentieth century.  In 1955, on the eve of the reapportionment 
revolution, nine states still elected at least one chamber purely by town 
or by county.94  Only twelve states required districts to be drawn solely 
on the basis of population.95  The “most common practice” was to allo-
cate representatives to state legislative districts, composed of one or 
more whole counties, in “rough proportion to their respective popula-
tions.”96  Most congressional districts also continued to respect the 
 
89 Id. at 900-02.  
90 See ZAGARRI, supra note 85, at 57-59; see also BAKER, supra note 85, at 20-21; DIXON, 
supra note 87, at 66-70 (observing that newer midwestern and western states typically 
used districts but also often guaranteed at least one representative for each county and 
barred districts from dividing counties). 
91 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 311 n.85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Gardner, Representation 
Without Party, supra note 27, at 914-15 (“At no time before the [reapportionment revo-
lution] did state constitutions authorize the creation of . . . districts that crossed local 
government boundaries.”); Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Rep-
resentation 130-32 (Mar. 31, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute 
of Technology), available at http://www.box.com/shared/ng2te8r03xd0y32ab262. 
92 See MONMONIER, supra note 61, at 4; Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Princi-
ples:  Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI. HIST. 159, 168-71 (1998) (analyzing congress-
ional districts’ correspondence to political subdivisions throughout U.S. history); Alt-
man, supra note 91, at 150-51, 163 n.112 (same). 
93 Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 914.  
94 BAKER, supra note 86, at 11. 
95 Id. at 12; DIXON, supra note 87, at 76-77. 
96 Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 578. 
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boundaries of political subdivisions (though the number of infractions 
inched higher).97  Just before the Supreme Court entered the fray, 
then, representation in America largely remained as it had always 
been:  founded first on districts that kept territorial communities in-
tact, and only afterward on the concept of equal district population. 
Not surprisingly, the reason why American representation took this 
form prior to the 1960s was that Americans tended to accept the theo-
ry of communal representation (discussed above in Part I).  By and 
large, that is, American jurisdictions agreed that territorial communi-
ties existed and ought to be represented as such in the legislature.  
Gordon Baker notes that electoral arrangements in this period “re-
flect[ed] . . . the force of localism, the view that every community 
should have . . . a distinct and substantial[] voice in the state legisla-
ture.”98  Similarly, state courts often explained their commitment to 
districts that respected community boundaries by waxing eloquent 
about the “common interests and objects” of each county’s residents,99 
“the community of interests in the respective counties,”100 and the 
“right” of counties “to be represented by their own members of the leg-
islature.”101  It was thus no coincidence that districts usually coincided 
with territorial communities in this era; rather, this was the natural re-
sult of the theory of representation to which most Americans adhered. 
Under this theory, gerrymandering was conceived as not only the 
undue pursuit of political advantage, but also the disruption of organic 
geographic communities.  The original Massachusetts gerrymander of 
 
97 See Altman, supra note 92, at 181 fig.7; Tucker, supra note 53, at 376.  
98 BAKER, supra note 85, at 27; see also REHFELD, supra note 52, at 57; JOHN PHILLIP 
REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
133 (1989) (arguing that American system of representation was based on “the local 
necessity, the local advantage, the benefit of local representatives . . . who knew the elec-
tors, their circumstances, needs, and desires”); Gardner, Representation Without Party, 
supra note 27, at 936, 939 (describing “fixture in American political thought” that “in-
habitants of a county or town . . . comprise a community,” which “justif[ies] the consti-
tutional designation of local governments . . . as the fundamental units of legislative 
representation”). 
99 Denney v. State ex rel. Basler, 42 N.E. 929, 937 (Ind. 1896). 
100 Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 108 (Va. 1932). 
101 State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 730 (Wis. 1892); see also 
People ex rel. Baird v. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 N.E. 827, 830 (N.Y. 1893) (discussing “cer-
tain community of interest among the inhabitants of a county”). 
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1812 provoked such ire (according to a scholar writing in 1907) be-
cause “[t]owns were separated and single towns were isolated from 
their proper counties.”102  Another early twentieth-century observer de-
fined gerrymandering as “a violation of the geographic unity of re-
gions,” with “[t]he amount of divergence of electoral boundaries from 
geographic boundaries” serving as “a measure of their fairness.”103  
Consistent with this definition, many states prohibited districts from 
dividing territorial communities.  The first such ban was adopted by 
Pennsylvania in 1790, and the idea eventually became one of the most 
common state constitutional techniques for combating gerrymander-
ing.104  As the Indiana Supreme Court explained in 1892, by “prohibit-
ing the division of counties in the formation of . . . districts,” the state 
constitution’s drafters “intended to put it beyond the power of the 
general assembly” to engage in gerrymandering.105 
B.  Decline and Fall 
This coherent conception of representation—in which districts 
corresponded to territorial communities and gerrymandering was un-
derstood as the absence of such congruence—came under fierce attack 
during the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s.  In a series of 
landmark decisions, the Supreme Court held that reapportionment 
 
102 GRIFFITH, supra note 87, at 17; see also POLE, supra note 51, at 247 (noting that in 
Massachusetts “old connections had been sundered” and “[g]enuine ‘interests’ had 
been divided”); James A. Gardner, Wandering Lonely as a Cloud:  National Citizenship and 
the Case for Non-Territorial Election Districts, 5 ELECTION L.J. 210, 211 (2006) (reviewing 
REHFELD, supra note 52)(explaining that 1812 Massachusetts gerrymander was “shock-
ing” because “it conspicuously flouted . . . county boundaries”). 
103 Sauer, supra note 41, at 404-05.  Sauer examined districts in Kentucky, Missouri, 
and Tennessee and identified several gerrymanders under his definition.  One district 
in Missouri, for example, “pair[ed] the cotton farmer of the Southeastern Lowlands 
with the native of the remote White River hills in Stone and Taney counties, most 
Ozarkian of the Ozarks.  A more ill-matched group would be hard to find.”  Id. at 413. 
104 See Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 916-20; see also GRIF-
FITH, supra note 87, at 95-97, 111-13, 123 (noting several states that adopted ban on 
division of communities). 
105 Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 32 N.E. 836, 842 (Ind. 1892); see also Cunningham, 
51 N.W. at 730 (ruling district plan invalid in part because of “breaking up of the lines 
and boundaries of counties by the new assembly districts”). 
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disputes are justiciable,106 and that the one-person, one-vote rule 
(which requires districts to have the same population) applies to fed-
eral,107 state,108 and local109 elections.  Crucially, the Court refused to 
relax the one-person, one-vote rule so that district and community 
boundaries could continue to coincide.  Instead, the Court insisted on 
near-perfect district equipopulation even at the cost of widespread 
community disruption. 
In the foundational 1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims, for instance, the 
Court rejected the argument that some discrepancies in district popu-
lation could be justified by a jurisdiction’s policy of keeping communi-
ties intact.  The Court asserted that political subdivisions are merely 
“subordinate governmental instrumentalities” and that “[l]egislators 
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”110  
Community-oriented “[c]onsiderations of area” were therefore “an 
insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population prin-
ciple.”111  Similarly, in the 1969 case of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Court 
invalidated a Missouri district plan whose population variances (of less 
than four percent) were motivated by “regard for such factors as the 
representation of distinct interest groups [and] the integrity of county 
lines.”112  The Court declared that “to accept population variances, 
large or small, in order to create districts with specific interest orienta-
tions is antithetical to . . . the constitutional command.”113 
 
106 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88, 237 (1962). 
107 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1964). 
108 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
109 See Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 476, 485-86 (1968). 
110 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562, 575. 
111 Id. at 580; see also id. at 579-80 (“[N]either history alone, nor economic or other 
sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from 
population-based representation.  Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
112 394 U.S. 526, 528-30 (1969). 
113 Id. at 533; see also Alfange, supra note 22, at 197 (“Kirkpatrick’s message to the 
gerrymanderer was clear:  there is absolutely no reason to be hesitant about splitting 
communities among various districts . . . .”).  Other Supreme Court cases in the 1960s 
reinforced Kirkpatrick’s message.  See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1969) 
(invalidating New York congressional plan that tried to “keep regions with distinct inter-
ests intact”); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 122-23 (1967) (per curiam) (invalidating 
Texas congressional plan that “resulted from a bona fide attempt . . . to respect county 
boundaries”); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686, 691-93 (1964) (invalidating Virginia 
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Perhaps the most striking example of the Court’s preoccupation 
with the one-person, one-vote rule, no matter what the communal cost, 
came in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly.114  In this 1964 case, Colo-
rado’s voters decisively rejected an initiative that would have reappor-
tioned both houses of the state legislature solely on the basis of 
population.115  Instead, majorities in every county endorsed a rival initia-
tive that would have reapportioned the state house based only on popu-
lation, and the state senate based on both population and “a variety of 
geographical, historical, topographic and economic considerations.”116  
The Court nevertheless struck down the voters’ preferred plan.117  It was 
irrelevant to the Court that the plan’s population deviations were quite 
small, that they were the product of “geography, . . . accessibility, ob-
servance of natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divi-
sions”—and even that they had been approved by the very voters whose 
rights the Court held had been violated.118 
Not surprisingly, the dissenters in this period recognized the trans-
formation wrought by the Court.  In Baker v. Carr, the 1962 decision 
that began the reapportionment revolution, Justice Frankfurter de-
cried the Court’s “massive repudiation of the experience of our whole 
past.”119  At great length, he reviewed the history of American district-
ing, which previously had revolved around the territorial community, 
and argued that it was this history that the Court was abandoning.120   
In Reynolds, similarly, Justice Harlan condemned the rupture with the 
past represented by the one-person, one-vote decisions.  He noted that 
the Court had dismissed in turn every non-population factor once 
thought relevant to districting:  “(1) history; (2) economic or other 
 
congressional plan that followed “tradition of respecting the integrity of the boundaries 
of cities and counties”). 
114 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
115 Id. at 717. 
116 Id. at 726-28, 738. 
117 Id. at 738-39. 
118 Id. at 719-20. 
119 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
120 See, e.g., id. at 269 (“[G]eography, economics, [and] urban-rural conflict . . . have 
throughout our history entered into political districting . . . .”); id. at 301 (noting that 
one-person, one-vote “was not the English system, it was not the colonial system, it was 
not the system chosen for the national government by the Constitution”). 
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sorts of group interests; (3) area; [and] (4) geographical considera-
tions . . . .”121  In Lucas too, Justice Stewart contended that the Court’s 
“draconian” adherence to equipopulation conflicted with the “strongly 
felt American tradition” that “many diverse interests” should be “ex-
pressed by a medley of component voices” in the legislature.122 
As all of the Justices expected (some eagerly, others apprehensive-
ly), the reapportionment revolution swiftly stripped the territorial 
community of its centrality in American districting.  Once federal, 
state, and local districts were all required to possess the same popula-
tion, the number of communities that had to be divided or merged 
increased radically.  In almost all areas, communities were not equi-
populous, meaning that the only way to comply with the one-person, 
one-vote rule was to countenance their wholesale disruption.  As Micah 
Altman found in a detailed study, “[T]he frequency of violations of 
‘traditional boundaries’ skyrocket[ed] following the population re-
quirements imposed by the Court in Reynolds . . . .”123  Counties, cities, 
and wards were broken up at triple their earlier rate, and the splitting 
of rural communities became widespread as well.124 
The reapportionment revolution also undermined the territorial 
community in a second, subtler way.  Under the Court’s one-person, 
one-vote doctrine, districts must be redrawn each decade after the lat-
est Census figures are released.125  As a result, there is now less oppor-
tunity for communities to coalesce on the basis of district boundaries.  
 
121 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622-23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 384 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that “[t]he Court’s holding surely flies in 
the face of history”); Baker, 369 U.S. at 330 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing “abrupt 
departure the majority makes from judicial history”). 
122 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746, 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
123 Altman, supra note 92, at 187. 
124 Id. at 180; see also Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness:  The Path of Politi-
cal Reform Since Baker v. Carr (“The equal population criterion inevitably wreaked havoc 
on geographic representation since in many instances homogeneous communities of 
interest had to be split or combined in order to achieve population equality . . . .”), in 
PARTY LINES:  COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 8 
(Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting 
Cases:  Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112 
(2000) (“[L]egislators used to be extremely reluctant to violate city, county, and town-
ship lines.  Now, under ‘one person, one vote,’ they are required to do so.”). 
125 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84. 
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Every ten years, those borders are unpredictably shaken and stirred, 
destabilizing any nascent communities that have begun to develop 
around them.  As one scholar has explained, “A boundary that is con-
tinually moving is one that is unlikely to serve . . . as a dividing line be-
tween genuinely distinct political communities.  In this way, one person, 
one vote continually impedes the formation . . . of meaningful local pol-
itical identity.”126 
C.  Comeback 
According to the conventional narrative, this is where the tale of 
the territorial community ends.  Once at the heart of the American sys-
tem of representation, it now has been eclipsed for good by the one-
person, one-vote rule.127  In this Section, I argue that this narrative is 
simplistic and in many ways incorrect.  While the territorial community 
may play a relatively small role in contemporary redistricting practice, it 
remains very much alive in both federal and state doctrine.  In fact, in 
areas as diverse as (1) reapportionment, (2) racial vote dilution, (3) 
racial gerrymandering, (4) political gerrymandering, and (5) state re-
districting law, the courts’ intuition that districts and communities 
should coincide still commonly drives (and gives coherence to) judicial 
outcomes.  This Section discusses the relevant case law and presents the 
surprisingly strong case for the territorial community’s continued doc-
trinal relevance.  The Section errs on the side of thoroughness because 
this story is an important one that has not previously been told. 
1.  Reapportionment 
As noted above, by the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court re-
fused to permit district population variances even if they were quite 
small and resulted from a good faith effort to respect the integrity of 
 
126 Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1242.  
127 Cf., e.g., id. at 1238-43 (failing to consider post-1960s doctrinal history of territo-
rial community); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:  The Role of Geographic Com-
pactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 173-74 (1989) 
(same); McConnell, supra note 124, at 108, 112 (same); Richard H. Pildes, Formalism 
and Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2003) 
(same). 
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territorial communities.128  Just a couple years later, the Court com-
menced a fairly dramatic retreat from this absolutist position.  Over a 
series of decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court accepted moder-
ate—and, in one case, extreme—population deviations that were the 
product of state policies promoting the representation of political sub-
divisions.  In the very field in which district-community congruence 
decisively had been rejected, it made a swift and improbable comeback. 
The comeback began with the 1971 case of Abate v. Mundt, in 
which the Court upheld districts for a county legislature that coincided 
perfectly with the county’s five towns.129  Though these districts were 
just as divergent in population as those struck down in earlier deci-
sions, the Court was suddenly flexible where before it had been un-
yielding.  “[T]he particular circumstances and needs of a local 
community . . . may sometimes justify departures from strict equality,” 
the Court remarked, adding that “exact [town-district] correspond-
ence” was desirable because it “encourage[d] town supervisors to serve 
on the county board.”130  These were the same arguments about dis-
tinct local interests and the quality of representation that the Court 
previously had dismissed out of hand.131 
In a 1973 case, the Court likewise endorsed a Virginia district plan 
that carefully avoided crossing city or county boundaries.132  Though 
the plan’s population deviations again were substantial, the Court de-
ferred to the state’s policy of “avoid[ing] the fragmentation of such 
subdivisions” and “afford[ing] them a voice in Richmond.”133  The 
Court further argued, in a mode entirely absent from its 1960s deci-
sions, that adverse consequences would follow if counties were divided 
among multiple districts:  “The opportunity of [their] voters to cham-
 
128 See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text. 
129 403 U.S. 182, 184-87 (1971).  These districts had a maximum deviation of 11.9%.  
Id. at 184. 
130 Id. at 185, 187. 
131 See NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND THE BURGER YEARS 46 (1991) 
(describing Abate as “the first Burger decision that is clearly consistent with the concep-
tualization of territorial representation”); Alfange, supra note 22, at 198 (noting that 
with Abate “the Court began a retreat from the extreme rigidity of its 1969 position”). 
132 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-28 (1973).  The plan had a maximum devia-
tion of 16.4%.  Id. at 319. 
133 Id. at 323. 
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pion local legislation [would be] virtually nil,” and their “representa-
tion [would be] no representation at all so far as local legislation is 
concerned.”134 
More remarkable still was the Court’s 1983 ratification of a Wyo-
ming district, corresponding to a small county, whose population di-
verged by sixty percent from the ideal.135  The Court approvingly cited the 
state legislature’s position that “the needs of each county are unique 
and the interests of each county must be guaranteed a voice.”136  The 
Court also relied on the trial court’s findings that “[t]he people within 
each county have many interests in common” and that “to deny these 
people their own representative borders on abridging their right to be 
represented.”137  Reasoning of this sort, of course, would have been un-
thinkable during the Warren Court’s one-person, one-vote heyday.  In 
that era, nothing was allowed to interfere with the Court’s quest for 
perfect population equality; indeed, claims that communities were 
unique and required their own representation routinely were reject-
ed.138  Fifteen years later, however, the Court was willing to tolerate ex-
treme population inequality as long as it was the result of a “legitimate 
policy of preserving county boundaries.”139  District-community congru-
ence had returned with a vengeance. 
 
134 Id. at 324; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161-62 (1993) (overturning 
district court’s decision to hold Ohio district plan unconstitutional that had substantial 
population deviations caused by “policy in favor of preserving county boundaries”); 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 & n.8 (1973) (largely upholding Texas plan with 
sizeable population variations that were precipitated by “policy against cutting county 
lines in forming representative districts”). 
135 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 843, 848 (1983). 
136 Id. at 839 n.4 (quoting 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 76, § 3). 
137 Id. at 841 n.5 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wyo. 
1982), aff’d, 462 U.S. 835); see also id. (noting district court’s finding that small county’s 
interests would be “virtually unprotected” if it were merged with larger county); 
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 234 (“[Brown] recognized what Chief Justice Warren had 
steadfastly refused to recognize—that political geography exists.”). 
138 See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
139 Brown, 462 U.S. at 847.  Brown is unusual in that the plaintiffs challenged only 
the over-representation of a single small county, and not the validity of the district plan 
as a whole.  See id. at 846-47.  Had they advanced a broader challenge, they may well 
have prevailed.  See id. at 848-50 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Moreover, the Court has 
shown no willingness to relax the one-person, one-vote rule for congressional (as op-
posed to state or local) districting.  See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727, 744 
 
Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2012 1:31 PM 
1416 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1379 
 
2.  Racial Vote Dilution 
District-community congruence has only ever played a starring role 
in the realm of racial vote dilution.  In this field, under both the Con-
stitution and the Voting Rights Act (VRA),140 minority plaintiffs may 
bring claims that their votes have been unlawfully diluted.  They may 
argue, in other words, that they have been denied sufficient political 
influence by district lines that “pack” or “crack” minority groups or by 
multimember districts in which minority voices are drowned out.  Cru-
cially, whether a dilution claim is constitutional or statutory, it requires 
in effect that the minority group constitute a coherent territorial 
community.  Under the Equal Protection Clause, both dilution cases 
in which the Supreme Court has granted relief have involved distinct 
minority communities.  Similarly, under section 2 of the VRA, the 
Court’s operative test includes explicit prongs for geographic com-
pactness and political cohesiveness. 
The Court first ruled in favor of plaintiffs advancing a constitu-
tional claim of racial vote dilution in the 1973 case of White v. 
Regester.141  Mexican Americans in San Antonio argued that they were 
effectively excluded from representation in the state legislature by a 
countywide multimember district.  The Court agreed, and replaced 
the multimember district with multiple single-member districts, in 
large part because it viewed the city’s Mexican Americans as a discrete 
and underprivileged geographic community.142  The Court observed 
that almost all of the Mexican Americans lived close together in the 
Barrio, “an area of poor housing” whose “residents have low income 
and a high rate of unemployment” and “suffer[] a cultural and lan-
guage barrier.”143  It was precisely in order “to bring the community 
into the full stream of political life” that the Court authorized the crea-
 
(1983) (striking down congressional district plan with maximum population deviation 
of less than one percent). 
140 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973--
1973bb-1 (2006)). 
141 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973). 
142 Id. at 769. 
143 Id. at 768. 
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tion of single-member districts in which the Mexican Americans could 
elect their preferred candidates.144 
The logic of the Court’s other decision granting relief to plaintiffs 
for constitutional vote dilution was nearly identical.  In a 1982 case, 
the Court found that African Americans in rural Burke County, Geor-
gia, were a “cohesive political group” with a “depressed socioeconomic 
status,” “less formal education,” and “less pay.”145  Accordingly, the 
Court dismantled the at-large election system that had prevented a 
single African American from being elected to the county commission, 
again replacing it with multiple single-member districts.146 
The Court has not decided a constitutional vote dilution case since 
1982 because, in that same year, Congress amended section 2 of the 
VRA to make it easier to bring statutory dilution claims.147  In its 1986 
decision interpreting the revised statute, Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court 
set forth a test composed of three prongs, two of which focus directly 
on whether a minority group comprises a territorial community.148  
“First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a sin-
gle-member district,” and “[s]econd, the minority group must be able 
to show that it is politically cohesive.”149  A minority group that cannot 
establish that it is geographically compact and politically cohesive—in 
other words, that it is a territorial community—cannot make out a di-
lution claim. 
Pursuant to this test, the Court has repeatedly ruled against minority 
groups that failed to prove compactness or cohesiveness.  In a 1993 case, 
for example, the Court concluded that a motley set of minority plaintiffs 
 
144 Id. at 769.  For similar reasons, the White Court also invalidated a Dallas multi-
member district that disadvantaged an African American community.  See id. at 765-67. 
145 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626-27 (1982). 
146 See id. at 627-28. 
147 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2, 96 
Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
148 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
149 Id. (emphasis added).  The Court further explained that “members of geo-
graphically insular racial and ethnic groups” are entitled to statutory protection be-
cause they “frequently share socioeconomic characteristics” that can give rise to 
communal ties, such as “income level, employment status, amount of education, hous-
ing and other living conditions, religion, [and] language.”  Id. at 64. 
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from Minneapolis (including African Americans, Hispanics, Asian 
Americans, and Native Americans) was not politically cohesive.150  An 
“agglomeration of distinct minority groups,” lacking shared interests or 
a common identity, could not amount to a community or prevail in a 
vote dilution challenge.151  Similarly, in a pair of 1996 cases, the Court 
held that highly non-compact districts combining disparate minority 
groups could not remedy alleged section 2 violations.152  Districts like the 
one in Texas that “reache[d] out to grab small and apparently isolated 
minority communities” could never be required by the VRA.153 
Conversely, in the important 2006 case League of United Latin Amer-
ican Citizens (LULAC)v. Perry, the Court both found vote dilution when 
a coherent Hispanic community in Texas was fragmented, and reject-
ed a proposed remedy that involved merging dissimilar Hispanic 
communities.154  The vote dilution took place when a “cohesive Latino 
community” that previously had been placed in a single district, and 
that had developed an “efficacious political identity,” was dispersed 
among multiple districts in order to protect an imperiled incumbent 
politician.155  “The State not only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobiliza-
tion efforts [against the incumbent] but also acted against those Latinos 
who were becoming most politically active, dividing them with a dis-
trict line through the middle of Laredo.”156  This sort of deliberate 
community disruption, the Court held (with Justice Kennedy writing), 
was prohibited.157 
Analogously, the problem with the State’s proposed remedial dis-
trict was that, while it had a Hispanic majority, it fused together two 
 
150 Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 38-41 (1993). 
151 Id. at 41.  
152 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 
899, 916-17 (1996). 
153 Bush, 517 U.S. at 979; see also Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 916 (holding that district that 
did not contain geographically compact minority population “could not remedy any 
potential § 2 violation”).  The Court also stated explicitly in Bush that the section 2 com-
pactness inquiry should take into account communal considerations.  See 517 U.S. at 977. 
154 548 U.S. 399, 430-31, 435 (2006). 
155 Id. at 435, 439. 
156 Id. at 440; see also id. at 441 (“The State chose to break apart a Latino opportunity 
district to protect the incumbent congressman from the growing dissatisfaction of the 
cohesive and politically active Latino community in the district.”). 
157 Id. at 440-41. 
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very different Hispanic communities.  “[T]here was a 300-mile gap be-
tween the Latino communities [in the district], and a similarly large 
gap between the needs and interests of the two groups.”158  Hispanics 
along the Mexican border and in Austin were “distant, disparate 
communities,” with major “differences in socio-economic status, edu-
cation, employment, health, and other characteristics.”159  A district 
that combined these “two farflung segments of a racial group with dis-
parate interests” thus could not cure the section 2 violation identified 
by the Court.160  A better example of how the territorial community 
test would operate (at least with regard to racial minorities) is hard to 
imagine.  District-community congruence had become, in LULAC, the 
Court’s measure for both vote dilution and any effort to remedy the 
wrongdoing.161 
3.  Racial Gerrymandering 
Though the literature has not yet recognized it, the Court also has 
employed something akin to the territorial community test in the con-
text of racial gerrymandering.  In this field of equal protection doc-
trine, which originated with the 1993 decision of Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 
a plaintiff may challenge a district on the ground that race was the 
predominant motive for the district’s creation.162  In a series of deci-
sions since Shaw I, the Court uniformly has struck down districts that 
combined disparate communities or deviated substantially from the 
larger communities in which they were located.  On the other hand, 
the Court invariably has upheld districts that coincided with underlying 
geographic communities.  District-community congruence therefore 
 
158 Id. at 432. 
159 Id. at 432, 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160 Id. at 433. 
161 Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
48, 50 (2006), http://michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/ortiz.pdf; Richard H. Pil-
des, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1159 
(2007) (noting that in LULAC “[t]he touchstone appears to be the concept of a ‘natu-
rally arising’ minority district, one that exists or would exist due to the geographic con-
centration of minority voters whose proximity also reflects common socioeconomic and 
other interests”). 
162 509 U.S. 630, 642, 649 (1993). 
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seems to be an ironclad defense to the charge that a district is a racial 
gerrymander. 
In both Shaw I and its 1996 sequel, the Court objected to a majority-
black North Carolina district that joined together “tobacco country, 
financial centers, and manufacturing areas.”163  The Court commented 
that districts that combine minority populations from different geo-
graphic communities are constitutionally suspect.  “A reapportion-
ment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the 
same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical 
and political boundaries . . . bears an uncomfortable resemblance to 
political apartheid.”164  In a 1995 case, the Court likewise invalidated a 
Georgia district that lumped together blacks in Atlanta and coastal 
Chatham County.165  These communities were “260 miles apart in dis-
tance and worlds apart in culture,” and they were characterized by 
“fractured political, social, and economic interests.”166  Their fusion 
plainly was not motivated by concern for community integrity, and in-
deed could be explained only by prohibited racial considerations. 
The communal harm was somewhat different in the 1996 case of 
Bush v. Vera.167  The three Texas districts at issue did not merge different 
communities, but they did markedly concentrate what were relatively 
diffuse minority populations.  One Dallas district meandered around 
the city in order “to connect dispersed minority population[s],”168 us-
ing “far-reaching tentacles that intricately and consistently maxim-
ize[d] the available . . . African-American population.”169  Analogously, 
the “interlocking shapes” of two Houston districts were “almost exclu-
sively[] the result of an effort to create, out of largely integrated com-
 
163 Id. at 635; see also Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899, 903, 917-18 (1996). 
164 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647; see also id. (objecting to districts “in which a State con-
centrated a dispersed minority”).  
165 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-20, 922 (1995). 
166 Id. at 908, 919; see also id. at 908 (“[T]he social, political, and economic makeup 
of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community.”). 
167 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
168 Id. at 966.   
169 Id. at 971 n.*. 
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munities, both a majority-black and a majority-Hispanic district.”170  
The Court found all three districts unconstitutional, in large part be-
cause they did not reflect accurately the characteristics of the broader 
communities in which they were drawn.  Again, the disjunction be-
tween constituency and community signaled that race had played too 
large a role in the districts’ creation. 
Conversely, the Court’s more recent racial gerrymandering deci-
sions all have upheld districts that did correspond to underlying terri-
torial communities.  In one 1997 case, the Court approved a Georgia 
district plan that avoided splitting counties, noting that “[t]hese small 
counties represent communities of interest” that should not be need-
lessly “chopp[ed] . . . in half.”171  In another 1997 case, the Court en-
dorsed a Tampa Bay district whose residents “regard[ed] themselves as a 
community” and that “comprise[d] a predominantly urban, low-income 
population . . . whose white and black members alike share[d] a simi-
larly depressed economic condition and interests that reflect[ed] it.”172  
And in the 1999 and 2001 chapters of North Carolina’s Shaw saga, the 
Court twice upheld a revised version of the district it previously had 
invalidated.173  One reason for the Court’s change of heart was that the 
updated district “joined three major cities in a manner . . . reflecting a 
real commonality of urban interests, [such as] inner city schools, ur-
ban health care[, and] public housing problems.”174  The updated dis-
trict, in other words, possessed the coherent communal identity that 
its predecessor had lacked. 
4.  Political Gerrymandering 
In the political gerrymandering arena, unlike in the above areas, a 
majority of the Court has never embraced the proposition that elec-
 
170 Id. at 1033 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 975 (plurality opinion) (describ-
ing “intricacy of the lines drawn, separating Hispanic voters from African-American 
voters on a block-by-block basis”). 
171 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 100 (1997). 
172 Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
173 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 
541, 552-54 (1999). 
174 Easley, 532 U.S. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hunt, 526 U.S. 
at 544 (describing revised district). 
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toral districts should correspond to territorial communities.  At the 
same time, the Court has never rejected the proposition either.  The 
Court has rebuffed all sorts of other potential standards for political 
gerrymandering cases:  for example, that voters should not experience 
a consistent degradation of their political influence, that the predom-
inant motive for a district’s creation should not be partisan advantage, 
and that statewide minority parties should not be able to entrench 
themselves in office.175  But the territorial community test proposed by 
this Article has never been definitively assessed. 
However, the notion that districts and communities should coincide 
has animated several Justices’ separate opinions in political gerryman-
dering cases.  A template for analyzing district-community congru-
ence—which could be adopted in the future without raising any stare 
decisis concerns—thus exists already in the case law.  In the 1983 case 
of Karcher v. Daggett, for instance, Justice Stevens’s concurrence argued 
that New Jersey’s district plan was unconstitutional because, among 
other things, it brazenly disrupted communities across the state.176  
The plan “wantonly disregard[ed] county boundaries” and evinced 
“little effort to create districts having a community of interests.”177  The 
residents of several districts were served by “different television and 
radio stations, different newspapers, and different transportation sys-
tems.”178  Two districts were particularly offensive because they merged, 
respectively, “New York suburbs [and] the rural upper reaches of the 
Delaware River” and “industrial Elizabeth, liberal, academic Princeton 
and largely Jewish Marlboro.”179 
Similarly, in the 1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer, Justice Powell’s sep-
arate opinion endorsed district-community congruence at the levels of 
both theory and practice.180  From a theoretical standpoint, “[a]dher-
ence to community boundaries . . . both deter[s] the possibilities of   
gerrymandering, and allow[s] communities to have a voice in the legisla-
 
175 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
176 462 U.S. 725, 762 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).  The majority opinion in 
Karcher solely addressed one-person, one-vote issues. 
177 Id. at 762, 764 n.33.   
178 Id. at 764 n.33. 
179 Id. at 762-63; see also id. at 789 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that many districts 
did not “reflect any attempt to follow natural, historical, or local political boundaries”). 
180 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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ture that directly controls their local interests.”181  But districts that do 
not correspond to communities, in Justice Powell’s view, foster voter 
uncertainty and apathy.  “Confusion inevitably follows . . . when a citizen 
finds himself or herself forced to associate with several artificial com-
munities,” and “the potential for voter disillusion and nonparticipa-
tion is great, as voters are forced to focus their political activities in 
artificial electoral units.”182 
Applying these principles, Justice Powell found much to criticize in 
Indiana’s district plan (which he would have invalidated).  As a whole, 
the plan showed “no concern for any adherence to principles of com-
munity interest,” as it “carved up counties, cities, and even townships” 
into “strange shapes lacking in common interests.”183  One especially 
objectionable district combined “blacks in Washington Township and 
white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties,” while another 
merged “Allen and Noble County farmers with residents of downtown 
Fort Wayne.”184  Fort Wayne itself was cut in two, and each half was 
linked to faraway rural counties.185  Around Indianapolis as well, an 
irregular C-shaped district “include[d] portions of the urban south-
westside of the city, the airport and suburban area . . . on the west side, 
and the Meridian Hills area at the northern part of the county.”186  
With its strong theoretical mooring and detailed factual analysis, this 
opinion is the best example in the Court’s case law of how the territo-
rial community test would function (particularly with regard to non-
racial communities). 
In the Court’s two most recent political gerrymandering decisions, 
Vieth in 2004 and LULAC in 2006, the dissenters once again called at-
tention to districts that failed to respect community boundaries.  In 
Vieth, Justice Stevens argued that a Pennsylvania district that “loom[ed] 
like a dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west, splitting up 
towns and communities throughout Montgomery and Berks Counties” 
 
181 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 Id. at 173 n.13, 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183 Id. at 176; see also id. at 177 (“[T]he mapmakers gave no consideration to the in-
terests of communities.”); id. (“[T]he manner in which the districts divide established 
communities . . . illustrate that community interests were ignored . . . .”). 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 180. 
186 Id. at 180 n.21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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should be struck down.187  In LULAC, likewise, he would have held un-
constitutional four Texas districts that were formed when a “minority 
community . . . was splintered and submerged into majority Anglo dis-
tricts in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.”188  The issue of district-community 
congruence was not as fully developed in these opinions as in Karcher 
and Bandemer (in part because of the parties’ litigation strategies189), 
but the communal strand still remained salient.  Were the Court so 
inclined, it could easily weave this strand into its future gerrymander-
ing decisions. 
5.  State Redistricting Law 
It is not just in federal doctrine that the territorial community has 
made a comeback in the last few decades.  In state law too, it is now 
recognized in a number of constitutions and statutes, and in even 
more non-binding redistricting guidelines.  State courts also tend to 
conceive of gerrymandering as the disruption of organic geographic 
communities and the creation of artificial political cleavages—
precisely the definition implicit in the territorial community test.  In 
recent years, indeed, a number of state courts have used the test to 
strike down districts that did not adhere to community boundaries and 
to uphold districts that did. 
The constitutions of five states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, and Hawaii) expressly require districts to reflect community in-
terests.  These provisions all were adopted between 1959 and 2010, 
and they include such formulations as Alaska’s mandate that districts 
contain “a relatively integrated socio-economic area,”190 California’s 
declaration that “[t]he geographic integrity of any . . . local community 
of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes [its] divi-
 
187 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 340 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
188 LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 479 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  It is clear that Justice Stevens would have invalidated these districts on politi-
cal gerrymandering grounds, not because of racial vote dilution.  See id. at 475.   
189 The petitioners in Vieth focused on statewide rather than district-specific claims.  
See 541 U.S. at 355 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The petitioners in LULAC emphasized the 
mid-decade timing of Texas’s redistricting.  See 548 U.S. at 413-23 (opinion of Kennedy, 
J.).  
190 ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
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sion,”191 and Hawaii’s admonition that communities not be “sub-
merge[d]” within areas where “substantially different socio-economic 
interests predominate.”192  Seven additional states have statutory re-
quirements that districts correspond to communities where possible, 
and a further twelve states adopted non-binding guidelines including 
similar provisions during the last redistricting cycle.193  These statutes 
and guidelines typically use the term “community of interest,” and 
when the term is defined, it usually refers to the shared social, cultural, 
and economic interests of people living in a particular area.194 
Consistent with these provisions, state courts tend to embrace the 
theory of communal representation (discussed above in Section I.A) 
and to understand gerrymandering as the violation of territorial com-
munities.  James Gardner recently completed a thorough survey of the 
state constitutional law on redistricting, in which he reached the follow-
ing three conclusions about the views of the state courts:195  First, they 
generally consider the entity that is represented in the legislature to be 
not the individual person (or any arbitrary set of people), but rather a 
geographic area that corresponds to particular interests.  “[T]erritory 
and interest . . . typically are thought to coincide.  People who live in the 
same place . . . are thought to have similar interests . . . [that] justify rep-
resenting them in the legislature by territorial groupings.”196  Second, 
the reasons why state courts believe that geographic proximity generates 
 
191 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
192 HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(8); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(D) (“Dis-
trict boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable . . . .”); 
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(3) (“[C]ommunities of interest, including ethnic, cultural, 
economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors, shall be preserved . . . .”).  
In addition, the county-preservation provision in North Carolina’s constitution and the 
compactness provision in Rhode Island’s constitution have been judicially interpreted 
to require consideration of communities of interest.  See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 
S.E.2d 377, 397 (N.C. 2002); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1255 (R.I. 2006). 
193 The seven states with statutory requirements are Idaho, Maine, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  The twelve states with similar guide-
lines are Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming.  See NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 172-217 (2009) [hereinafter NCSL 
GUIDE] (describing redistricting process in each state). 
194 See id. 
195 See Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27. 
196 Id. at 933-34. 
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a sense of community are (1) that people who live nearby “share a 
common local economy and economic life” and (2) that they “partici-
pate together in the public life of a shared unit of political and govern-
mental administration.”197  Community flows, in other words, from 
shared commercial and civic experience. 
Third, and most important here, state courts usually define gerry-
mandering as the needless disruption of geographic communities.  
Districts are supposed to correspond to such communities in order to 
produce a political life that is “harmonious at home due to the unity of 
local economic interest” and “conflictual far away in the state legisla-
ture due to the . . . diversity of the interests represented.”198  Gerry-
mandering, alas, interferes on both sides of the equation.  At the district 
level, it divides communities and combines people with conflicting in-
terests, thus fostering acrimony.199  At the state legislative level, it en-
courages partisanship and ideological extremism instead of hearty 
pluralism.  “[P]recisely because it disregards the ‘natural’ territorial 
cleavages . . . that divide the state populace,” gerrymandering enables 
the ascendance of party and ideology.200  Or so, at least, say the state 
courts. 
Based on this conception of gerrymandering, courts in ten states 
(Alaska,201 Arizona,202 Colorado,203 Idaho,204 Kansas,205 Montana,206 North 
 
197 Id. at 939. 
198 Id. at 963-64. 
199 Id. at 964. 
200 Id. at 965. 
201 In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 149-50 (Alaska 2002); Hickel v. Se. 
Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 44-54 (Alaska 1993); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 
P.2d 1352, 1359-61 (Alaska 1987); Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1214-15 
(Alaska 1983); Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879-80 (Alaska 1974). 
202 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
121 P.3d 843, 867-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
203 In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 46 P.3d 1083, 1090-91 (Colo. 
2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1247-49, 1251-52 
(Colo. 2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 213, 215-17 
(Colo. 1992); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 194-200 
(Colo. 1992); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212-13 
(Colo. 1982); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194 (Colo. 
1982). 
204 Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 865-71 
(Idaho 2002). 
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Carolina,207 Oregon,208 Rhode Island,209 and Vermont210) have invalidat-
ed districts that did not correspond to geographic communities and 
upheld districts that did.  These decisions—which vividly illustrate the 
territorial community test in action—all were handed down between 
1974 and 2006, with their frequency increasing in recent years.  In 
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, the de-
cisions were based on state constitutional requirements that districts 
and communities coincide, while the Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Ore-
gon, and Vermont cases relied on analogous statutory and guideline 
provisions.  In sum, courts have assessed more than fifty districts based 
on their adherence to community boundaries, of which a solid majority 
have been upheld.211 
Examples of districts that have been struck down include:  an Alas-
ka district that joined the hub of an agricultural region with coastal 
fishing villages;212 another Alaska district that merged suburban Wasilla 
with urban Anchorage;213 a Colorado district that combined very dif-
 
205 Graham v. Thornburgh, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1294-95 (D. Kan. 2002); In re Pe-
tition of Stephan, 836 P.2d 574, 581-83 (Kan. 1992). 
206 McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913, 915-18 (D. Mont. 1983). 
207 Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 252-54 (N.C. 2003). 
208 Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972 (Or. 2001); Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296, 
304-06 (Or. 1991). 
209 Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1255-56 (R.I. 2006). 
210 In re Reapportionment of Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117 (Vt. 
2004); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 
323, 345-46 (Vt. 1993).   
211 Both state and federal courts have also drawn districts based in large part on 
communal considerations.  See, e.g., Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-0121, 02-0366, 
2002 WL 34127471, at *3, *7 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002); Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
529, 542-46 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. 
Supp. 684, 688 (D. Ariz. 1992); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. 
Wis. 1992); Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 636-38 (E.D. Wis. 
1982); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 89-93 (D. Colo. 1982); LaComb v. Growe, 
541 F. Supp. 145, 148-50 (D. Minn. 1982); O’Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp. 1200, 1203-
06 (D. Kan. 1982); Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 894, 896 (Alaska 1972); Wilson v. 
Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 551-53 (Cal. 1992); Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 10, 16 
(Cal. 1973); Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 647, 651-52 (Colo. 2002); In re 2003 Ap-
portionment of State Senate, 827 A.2d 844, 847-48 (Me. 2003); Mellow v. Mitchell, 607 
A.2d 204, 224 (Pa. 1992). 
212 See Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 52-53 (Alaska 1993). 
213 See id. at 53. 
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ferent neighborhoods within Denver;214 two more Colorado districts 
that divided Aspen from neighboring Snowmass;215 three Idaho dis-
tricts that split the state’s rugged southeast corner;216 and a Vermont 
district that lumped together towns on opposite sides of the Green 
Mountains.217  Conversely, districts have been upheld where there was 
evidence that their residents worked in similar industries, shared a 
racial or ethnic heritage, interacted in community organizations, re-
ceived information from the same media sources, or were connected 
by transport links.218  In these circumstances, the courts could not con-
clude that any community disruption—with its negative implications 
for harmony in the district and partisanship in the legislature—had 
occurred. 
III.  DEVELOPING THE DOCTRINE 
The above Parts demonstrate that the principle of district-
community congruence has a robust theoretical, historical, and doc-
trinal pedigree.  It is rooted in a theory of representation that is par-
ticularly consistent with the American commitment to geographic 
districting.  It has functioned as a crucial touchstone for district draw-
ers for most of American history.  And, though neither courts nor 
scholars previously have noticed, it continues to drive judicial out-
comes in a host of election law domains.   
Accordingly, there is at least a plausible basis for the Supreme 
Court to constitutionalize the territorial community test.  In Philip 
Bobbitt’s terminology, the test is supported by ethical, historical, and 
doctrinal modalities of constitutional argument.219  To be sure, an ex-
 
214 See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212 (Colo. 
1982). 
215 See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 195-96 (Colo. 
1992). 
216 See Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 869-71 
(Idaho 2002).  Because the court struck down the entire district plan on one-person, 
one-vote grounds, its discussion of certain communities’ division was technically dicta. 
217 See In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 
A.2d 323, 331 (Vt. 1993). 
218 See infra notes 237-48. 
219 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (summarizing 
six modalities of constitutional interpretation).  The territorial community test is also 
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plicit textual hook is missing, but similar concerns did not prevent the 
Court from endorsing the one-person, one-vote rule (the only Equal 
Protection doctrine that ignores intent altogether) or the prohibition 
on racial gerrymandering (the only standard that does not require any 
particularized harm).  Moreover, as Issacharoff and Pildes have noted, 
the Constitution addresses electoral practices in such oblique terms 
that the Court has long had to fashion the law of democracy mostly by 
reference to overarching structural principles.220  Justices and academ-
ics alike have therefore sought to combat political gerrymandering 
without worrying much about the specific textual bases for their ef-
forts.221  The territorial community test fits squarely within this tradition.  
This Part, then, considers how the test might operate if it were  
converted by the Court—or enacted by Congress, the states, or the 
people themselves—into actual doctrine.222  I first define the territorial 
 
supported by Bobbitt’s structural and prudential modalities of argument.  Cf. infra Parts 
IV-V (discussing test’s manageability and political consequences); infra text accompanying 
note 220 (elaborating on structural value of participatory democracy). 
220 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 713, 716 (discussing “the great silences 
of the Constitution regarding the structure of electoral politics” and the “Court’s ef-
forts to fill the gaps of [its] framework for democratic politics”); see also Issacharoff, 
supra note 70, at 687-88.  The structural principle that is most relevant here is participa-
tory democracy, which is rooted most deeply in the Republican Guarantee Clause, see 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and which has been stressed by writers including John Hart Ely, 
see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 116-25 
(1980), and Justice Breyer, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 21-34 (2005).  As both a theoretical and an empirical mat-
ter, districts that correspond to territorial communities tend to promote democratic 
participation.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical reasons 
why this is so); see also infra subsections V.A.3, V.B.3 (presenting empirical confirma-
tion). 
221 None of the Justices who proposed political gerrymandering standards in Karch-
er, Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC attempted to provide any textual foundation for their 
approaches.  Similarly, Issacharoff and Pildes freely admit that their competition-
centered test is not textually grounded.  See Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 687 (conced-
ing that he can offer “no narrow textual justification” for his approach); Issacharoff & 
Pildes, supra note 10, at 716. 
222 Because the territorial community test is not constitutionally compelled, it might 
be preferable for it to be adopted by legislation or popular initiative rather than by 
judicial declaration.  In addition, even if the test is not embraced as a self-standing bar 
on gerrymandering, it could be treated as a key component of a broader inquiry.  For 
instance, a district plan’s needless disruption of geographic communities is powerful 
evidence that partisan advantage (or incumbent protection) motivated the line-drawers.  
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community as clearly as possible, drawing on state and federal case law 
as well as state constitutional provisions.  I next explain how judges 
might employ the territorial community test to assess district plans, 
again using doctrinal examples and focusing on the three ways in 
which communities can be disrupted:  fusion, fragmentation, and sub-
version.  Lastly, I discuss the test’s links to adjacent election law do-
mains, arguing that it would promote doctrinal coherence, reduce vio-
lations of other redistricting rules, and lessen the salience of divisive 
racial rhetoric. 
A.  Defining the Territorial Community 
As used in this Article, a territorial community is (1) a geograph-
ically defined group of people who (2) share similar social, cultural, 
and economic interests and (3) believe they are part of the same co-
herent entity.  The first element, geographic demarcation, is necessary 
because of the American commitment to geographic districting.  
While non-geographic communities certainly exist, they cannot easily 
be captured by districts that are drawn spatially.  The second element, 
shared interests, is mostly objective in character and gives rise to 
groups of people who are affected in similar ways by (and usually have 
similar positions on) the gamut of governmental actions.  The com-
mon concerns that are most relevant here are those that bear on some 
matter of actual or potential governmental policy.  Lastly, the third 
element, a feeling of communal affiliation, is subjective in nature.  It 
ensures that members of a community actually understand themselves 
to be part of the same cognizable unit.223 
 
Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating 
partisan intent as standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders).  
223 Unsurprisingly, this definition is closely related to the theory of communal rep-
resentation discussed in Section I.A.  See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.  It is 
also similar to the definitions advanced by various scholars.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, 
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1127 
(1996) (referring to community as “a place with a distinctive history, identifiable char-
acteristics, and a unique identity”); Ford, supra note 58, at 859 (“An organic community 
may be united primarily by economy or by culture.”); David M. Hummon, Community 
Attachment:  Local Sentiment and Sense of Place (discussing community’s “complex sources 
in both subjectively perceived and objective aspects of the local environment”), in 
PLACE ATTACHMENT 253, 253 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992).   
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This definition draws from earlier judicial and state constitutional 
efforts.  The Supreme Court’s Gingles factors, for example, require that 
a minority group be geographically compact, politically cohesive, and, 
at least as construed in LULAC, socioeconomically and culturally uni-
fied.224  My conception of the territorial community is not very differ-
ent from the application of the Gingles factors to all groups rather than 
only to racial minorities.  Similarly, state and lower federal courts often 
have drawn districts so that they correspond to “[t]he social and eco-
nomic interests common to the population of an area which are prob-
able subjects of legislative action”225 or to “distinctive units which share 
common concerns with respect to . . . demography, ethnicity, culture, 
socio-economic status or trade.”226  While these standards do not take 
into account people’s subjective sense of affiliation, they are otherwise 
analogous to my approach.  So too are state constitutional provisions 
that define the territorial community in objective terms:  e.g., “a rela-
tively integrated socio-economic area” (Alaska),227 or “a contiguous 
population which shares common social and economic interests” (Cal-
ifornia).228 
I use the term “territorial community” instead of the more com-
mon “community of interest” because of certain connotations that the 
latter phrase has acquired.  For one thing, a community of interest 
does not have to be spatially bounded, meaning that it coexists uneasi-
 
It is worth noting as well that territorial communities can shift over time as people’s 
interests and affiliations change.  Courts should keep in mind the possibility of such 
shifts when they seek to ascertain community boundaries.  Lastly, it is important to 
acknowledge that there are inevitably exceptions and outliers in any territorial commu-
nity.  The concept is meant to capture the interests and affiliations of most—not all—
people in a geographically defined area.  See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
224 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); see also supra notes 147-61 
and accompanying text. 
225 Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 16 (Cal. 1973); see also Order Stating Redis-
tricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions at 3, Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, 
No. C0-01-160 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (defining communi-
ties of interest as “groups of Minnesota citizens with clearly recognizable similarities of 
social, geographic, political, cultural, ethnic, economic, or other interests”). 
226 Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 91 (D. Colo. 1982). 
227 ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
228 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).  Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Vermont, 
and Virginia include similar definitions in their state constitutions, statutes, or redistrict-
ing guidelines.  See NCSL GUIDE, supra note 193, at 175-76, 183-84, 194-96, 210-14. 
Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2012 1:31 PM 
1432 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1379 
 
ly with the American system of geographic districting.  In addition, a 
community of interest can be deemed to arise on the basis of any 
common concern, making the term notably imprecise and mallea-
ble.229  With its strong geographic valence and emphasis on the full 
array of interests and affiliations that people share, the concept of a 
territorial community seems substantially more determinate. 
A territorial community also is not quite the same thing as a politi-
cal subdivision such as a town or county.  The two may sometimes be 
functionally identical, both because subdivisions tend to be inhabited 
by people with similar socioeconomic characteristics,230 and because 
civic ties can foster a sense of kinship.  But communities and subdivi-
sions are often different as well—as when people’s interests and affilia-
tions do not follow subdivision lines, or when subdivisions contain 
within them more than one (or only part of a) community.231  There is 
thus nothing wrong with judges beginning their inquiry with subdivision 
boundaries, but the task of identifying territorial communities cannot 
end there.232 
Furthermore, territorial communities exist, and should be repre-
sented in the legislature, at different levels of generality.  As the geo-
grapher David Knight has written, “[W]e have ties to different scales of 
territory and . . . we can operate at several levels of abstraction at any 
 
229 See In re Legislative Redistricting of State, 475 A.2d 428, 445 (Md. 1982) (charac-
terizing concept of “communit[y] of interest” as “nebulous” and “unworkable”); Gard-
ner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 937-38 (noting that “community of 
interest” is used “so broadly and indiscriminately as to include virtually any group of 
people who share some trait or characteristic that has the potential to be salient politi-
cally” and “is not linked in any particular way to a specific piece of territory”). 
230 See GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS:  POLITICAL FRAGMENTA-
TION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 100-07, 190 (1991); Richard Briffault, Our Lo-
calism:  Localism and Legal Theory (pt. 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 353-54 (1990). 
231 See BAKER, supra note 85, at 102 (“Economic and social interests usually trans-
cend county and even state lines.”); BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 49, at 70; DANIEL J. 
ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC:  THE IMPACT OF SPACE, TIME, AND CULTURE ON AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 289 (1994) (“[I]n many cases, the limits of specific civil communities may 
be less easily discovered within formal political boundaries.”); HANSON, supra note 49, 
at 130 (“[P]olitical subdivisions . . . are quite likely to fail to reflect . . . a community of 
interest . . . .”). 
232 Cf., e.g., Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 575 (Cal. 1992) (giving “precedence to 
keeping geographically compact minority groups together rather than maintain[ing] 
city boundaries”). 
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one time—from personal to small group, to a parochial localism . . . to 
a broader regionalism.”233  Quite specific groups can therefore form 
state house (or even smaller-scale) districts, while broader communi-
ties can be captured by state senate districts, and yet more diffuse 
groups by congressional districts.  The particularity of the community 
that comprises a given district typically varies in accordance with the 
district’s size.234   
Examples illustrating these definitional points abound in state and 
federal law.  The significance of geographic demarcation (the first ele-
ment of a territorial community) is conveyed by the Supreme Court’s 
racial redistricting cases.  According to the Court, far-flung, noncon-
tiguous groups of minority voters—like the Hispanics along the Mexi-
can border and in Austin in LULAC, and the African Americans 
scattered across North Carolina in Shaw I—do not constitute cogniza-
ble communities.235  Because of their lack of geographic connected-
ness, they do not warrant their own districts under section 2 of the 
VRA, and the Equal Protection Clause may well be violated if they are 
placed within the same constituencies.236   
These decisions also demonstrate some of the shared interests that 
can give rise to genuine communities (the second element).  Race alone 
 
233 Knight, supra note 58, at 515; see also ELAZAR, supra note 231, at 3; MORRILL, su-
pra note 58, at 23; Robert J. Chaskin, Perspectives on Neighborhood and Community:  A Re-
view of the Literature, 71 SOC. SERVICE REV. 521, 535 (1997) (“[T]he units in which the 
circumstances and activities of daily life inhere can be ‘nested,’ where each member of 
a community is simultaneously a member of others.”). 
234 See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 (1973) (noting that “congressional dis-
tricts are not so intertwined and freighted with strictly local interests as are state legisla-
tive districts”); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 
624 A.2d 323, 345 (Vt. 1993) (observing that it is “difficult, if not impossible, to achieve 
the same level of common interests among individual towns within Senate districts that 
is attainable among towns within House districts”).  The implication is that legislatures 
composed of smaller districts (e.g., state houses) would focus on specific localized con-
cerns, while legislatures composed of larger districts (e.g., Congress) would devote 
more attention to broader and more diffuse issues. 
235 See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 442 (2006); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
236 See supra subsections II.C.2-3; see also Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 
1218 (Alaska 1983) (Matthews, J., concurring) (noting that town belonged to different 
community than rest of district, despite similar economic interests, where it was located 
“700 miles and two time zones away”); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 
828 P.2d 185, 195 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (criticizing district that combined uncon-
nected counties on opposite sides of Continental Divide). 
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is never enough, in the Court’s view, but race plus cultural isolation (as 
with the Hispanics in San Antonio’s Barrio in White), or race plus urban 
poverty (as with the Tampa Bay African Americans in Lawyer), can suf-
fice.237  Outside the Court’s case law, it is common socioeconomic inter-
ests that are most often thought to generate communities.  California’s 
constitution, for instance, specifies that a territorial community can be 
“an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area,” 
or an “area[] in which the people share similar living stand-
ards . . . [or] have similar work opportunities.”238  Analogously, lower 
courts have recognized communities such as Alaskan fishing villages,239 
rural farmland in Oregon,240 ski towns in the Rockies,241 industrial areas 
in California,242 bedroom suburbs of Denver and San Francisco,243 and 
the urban cores of several major cities.244  Additional factors the courts 
have deemed relevant to community formation include transportation 
links between areas,245 membership in regional organizations,246 the 
level of residents’ commercial interaction,247 and their degree of reli-
ance on the same media outlets.248 
 
237 See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997); White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973).  These cases also underscore the distinction between a com-
munity of interest and a territorial community.  People of the same race are clearly a 
community of interest, but they are not a territorial community (which may prevail in a 
section 2 challenge and defeat a racial gerrymandering claim) unless they also live near 
one another, share non-racial interests, and feel subjectively unified. 
238 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
239 See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879 n.65 (Alaska 1974). 
240 See Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296, 303 n.10 (Or. 1991). 
241 See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 652 (Colo. 2002). 
242 See Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 29 (Cal. 1973). 
243 See Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 93 (D. Colo. 1982); Reinecke, 516 P.2d at 31. 
244 See, e.g., Carstens, 543 F. Supp. at 96 (Denver); Groh, 526 P.2d at 879-80 (Anchor-
age); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 581, 583, 587, 588 (Cal. 1992) (San Francisco, Sacra-
mento, Los Angeles, and San Diego). 
245 See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1363 (Alaska 1987); 
Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972, 982-83 (Or. 2001). 
246 See, e.g., In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002); In re Re-
apportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 340 (Vt. 
1993). 
247 See, e.g., Kenai, 743 P.2d at 1362-63; In re Reapportionment of Towns of Wood-
bury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Vt. 2004). 
248 See, e.g., Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 
870 (Idaho 2002); Hartung, 33 P.3d at 982. 
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Finally, with regard to subjective affiliation (the third element of a 
territorial community), a number of cases have highlighted its im-
portance and shown that it does not always coincide with objective in-
terests.  In Arizona, for example, the neighboring Navajo and Hopi 
tribes share many socioeconomic concerns but are also historical ad-
versaries with clashing identities; accordingly, they have long been 
placed in different congressional districts.249  Similarly, in Colorado, 
adjacent Pueblo and El Paso Counties resemble each other in several 
respects, but nevertheless do not comprise an authentic community 
because they are “commercial rivals” and “hereditary enemies.”250  
Conversely, the Hispanics in the original Texas district in LULAC 
(which the Court endorsed) were just as heterogeneous as the Hispan-
ics in the new district (which the Court struck down).251  The first 
group, however, was far more “cohesive and politically active”—that is, 
a far more subjectively unified community.252 
B.  Doctrinal Details 
Armed with a clearer understanding of what one is, how should a 
court go about deciding whether a district does or does not disrupt a 
territorial community?  In my view, there are three types of disruption 
that the court should consider:  fusion, fragmentation, and subversion.  
Any of these should be enough to invalidate a district, but the court 
should be relatively deferential toward any explanation offered by the 
State as to how the district in fact corresponds to a community.  The 
court should also keep in mind that the one-person, one-vote rule 
makes inevitable a certain amount of community disruption—but that 
this disruption can and should be minimized by intelligent district 
drawing.  
 
249 See Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D. 
Ariz. 1992); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 868, 871 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
250 Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 92 (D. Colo. 1982); see also Carpenter v. 
Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Alaska 1983) (invalidating district that combined 
communities similar in their interests but “completely separate” in their “social activity”). 
251 LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 432 (2006). 
252 Id. at 441. 
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The first kind of disruption is fusion:  the needless placement of 
different territorial communities within the same district.  Fusion is 
what occurred in LULAC when Hispanics along the Mexican border 
and in Austin were joined together even though they were “distant, 
disparate communities.”253  It was also fusion when African Americans 
from North Carolina’s “tobacco country, financial centers, and manu-
facturing areas” were merged in Shaw I,254 and when blacks in Atlanta, 
Savannah, and coastal Chatham County—“260 miles apart in distance 
and worlds apart in culture”—were lumped together in Miller.255  In all 
three cases, of course, the Court struck down the offending districts.256 
The second type of disruption is fragmentation:  the unnecessary di-
vision of a territorial community among multiple districts.  Fragmenta-
tion took place in LULAC when the cohesive Hispanic community that 
previously had been placed in a single district was dispersed among 
several new districts in order to protect an endangered incumbent pol-
itician.257  Fragmentation also occurred in the 1977 case of United Jewish 
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey when a group of Hasidic 
Jews in Brooklyn was split between two state assembly and two state 
senate districts.258  While a divided Court ruled against the Hasidim (in 
a period prior to the Court’s recognition of a cause of action for racial 
gerrymandering),259 Chief Justice Burger wrote in dissent that “mem-
bers of an ethnic community” have “the constitutional right not to be 
carved up” for another group’s benefit.260 
The final kind of disruption is subversion:  the creation of a district 
that diverges sharply from the defining characteristics of the larger 
community in which it is located.  Communities are not perfectly uni-
 
253 Id. at 434. 
254 Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993). 
255 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995).  According to my survey of the case 
law, fusion is the kind of community disruption that has most often led state courts to 
invalidate districts. 
256 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442; Miller, 515 U.S. at 927; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649. 
257 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435, 439. 
258 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977). 
259 Id. at 167-68. 
260 Id. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Hasidim also lost because they did not 
advance an explicit community-based claim to their own district.  See id. at 154 n.14 
(majority opinion).  In the state courts, fragmentation is a less common basis for inval-
idating a district than fusion. 
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form in their spatial composition, meaning that it is sometimes possi-
ble to draw districts that fit entirely within them but that deviate dra-
matically from their overall tenor.  In Bush, for example, a largely 
integrated area around Houston was sliced by highly convoluted lines 
into one majority-black district and one majority-Hispanic district.261  
These boundaries subverted what was a genuinely mixed community 
into two unrepresentative halves.  Similarly, in the 1960 case of Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot, the city border of Tuskegee, Alabama was converted 
from a square into an “uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that careful-
ly separated white and black voters.262  A biracial area was thus trans-
formed into a white city and a black hinterland.  The Court invalidated 
the schemes in both cases.263 
Presented with a claim that a territorial community has been dis-
rupted, a court should display reasonable deference toward the State’s 
justification for the challenged district.  Such respect is appropriate, 
first, because there is—notwithstanding this Article’s efforts in the pre-
vious Section—a fair amount of fuzziness in the concept of a territorial 
community.  When a State is able to mount a solid case that a district 
corresponds to a community, relying on evidence contemporaneous 
with the district’s creation, it follows that judges should uphold the 
district even if they disagree personally as to the degree of district-
community congruence.  Judicial restraint is also necessary in order to 
reduce the potential invasiveness of the territorial community test.  
Were judges free to strike down every district that, in their considered 
view, failed to adhere to a community, a large number of districts 
would end up on thin ice.  Limiting the test to cases where the State 
cannot present a credible defense preserves legislative authority over 
redistricting and focuses the doctrine on severe instances of community 
disruption. 
For precisely these reasons, state courts that employ something 
akin to the territorial community test universally have adopted quite 
 
261 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 975 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
262 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 59 (1964) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing “zigzag, tortuous lines [that were] drawn to con-
centrate Negroes and Puerto Ricans in Manhattan’s Eighteenth Congressional District 
and practically to exclude them from the Seventeenth”).  I have not found any state 
cases invalidating districts because of community subversion. 
263 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 976, 983; Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347-48. 
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deferential standards of review.  They invalidate districts only when they 
find clear constitutional or statutory violations, and not when they mere-
ly quarrel with the legislature’s reasoned explanations for its district 
drawing choices.  In Vermont, for instance, the state supreme court 
has stated that “it is primarily the Legislature, not this Court, that must 
make the necessary compromises to effectuate state constitutional 
goals.”264  The court is willing to strike down districts only when plain-
tiffs demonstrate “the absence of a rational or legitimate basis for the 
challenged plan[].”265  Similarly, Colorado’s supreme court has charac-
terized its review as “narrow” and commented that “we should not sub-
stitute our judgment for the Commission’s unless we are convinced the 
Commission departed from constitutional criteria.”266  These statements 
are consistent with my view of how the territorial community test 
should operate. 
A related issue for a court applying the test is that districts and 
communities can never coincide perfectly thanks to the one-person, 
one-vote rule.  Communities, of course, do not come in populations 
that are tidy multiples of the ideal district size, meaning that some de-
gree of community disruption is inevitable whenever districts are drawn.  
This disruption, however, can and should be minimized by savvy dis-
trict drawing.  For example, when smaller communities must be com-
bined in order to form a sufficiently populous district, groups that are 
as similar as possible in their interests and affiliations should be 
joined.  Analogously, when a larger community must be divided into 
multiple districts, these districts should either correspond to more 
specific subcommunities, if they exist, or else mirror the characteristics 
of the broader community.267  The point is that the needless fusion, 
 
264 In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 
323, 326 (Vt. 1993). 
265 Id. at 327. 
266 In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194, 197 (Colo. 
1982); see also Graham v. Thornburgh, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan. 2002) 
(adopting deferential review standard); Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1214-
15 (Alaska 1983) (same); Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296, 303 (Or. 1991) (same); Parella 
v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1256 (R.I. 2006) (same). 
267 See Backstrom et al., supra note 22, at 153 (discussing how principle of commu-
nity preservation can be deployed both when communities must be split and when they 
must be combined). 
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fragmentation, and subversion of communities should be avoided, so 
that the one-person, one-vote rule does not result in more community 
ruptures than are necessary.268 
The case law provides numerous illustrations of how this can be 
done.  Presented with an island borough that was too small to support 
its own state house district, for instance, the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that it should be combined with a nearby lake region rather than 
an adjacent peninsula.  The court’s rationale was that the island and 
the lake region were more closely related thanks to their municipal 
ties and involvement in commercial fishing.269  Similarly, a federal dis-
trict court in Colorado that was forced to divide Denver because it was 
too large for a single congressional district severed the city’s southwest 
corner and thereby left it “more compact” and with its “minority and 
neighborhood communities” intact.270  The court also merged small 
Denver suburbs and split counties (where it had no other option) based 
on “the stark contrast between the concerns of the expanding munici-
palities and the outlying rural areas.”271  This is the sort of sensible dis-
 
268 The larger population variances allowed by the Court for state legislative dis-
tricts would reduce the community disruption caused by the one-person, one-vote rule 
at this level.  See supra subsection II.C.1.  The disruption would be greater at the con-
gressional redistricting level, at which essentially no population deviations are permitted.  
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1983). 
The disruptive impact of the one-person, one-vote rule could also be reduced 
through the use of floterial districts.  These are districts that overlay (or “float above”) 
multiple conventional districts, providing additional representation to voters whose dis-
tricts would otherwise be overpopulated.  For instance, a community whose population 
entitles it to 1.5 representatives could be kept intact in a single conventional district with 
a single representative, while also being included in a larger floterial district that in-
cludes other overpopulated conventional districts.  See generally Gary F. Moncrief, Floterial 
Districts, Reapportionment, and the Puzzle of Representation, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 251 (1989). 
269 In re 2001 Redististricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002); see also id. (en-
suring that each portion of community that was divided between two districts was “inte-
grated, as nearly as practicable, with the district in which it [was] placed”). 
270 Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 87, 96 (D. Colo. 1982). 
271 Id. at 96-97; see also O’Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (D. Kan. 1982) 
(labeling as its “lodestar” the goal of “grouping together . . . as many major communi-
ties . . . as possible” while still complying with one-person, one-vote rule); Beauprez v. 
Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 652 (Colo. 2002) (choosing most logical Colorado west slope 
counties to merge with Denver suburbs); Ater, 819 P.2d at 303 n.10 (using “best of the 
available choices” when forced to split an Oregon county); In re Reapportionment of 
Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 336 (Vt. 1993) (noting approv-
ingly that district line that divided Vermont town “was drawn to separate [its] most urban 
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trict drawing, attentive to both population figures and communal ties, 
that courts should expect (and require) from legislatures. 
A final point about the territorial community test is that it need 
not serve as the judiciary’s only tool for combating political gerryman-
dering.  In fact, because it focuses on specific districts’ congruence with 
communities, it could be complemented effectively by standards that 
aim to cure statewide pathologies.  The two obvious candidates, both 
discussed earlier, are measures of district competitiveness and gauges 
of how fairly a district plan treats the two major parties.272  While my 
position remains that the territorial community test is more consistent 
with the American commitment to geographic districting than these 
approaches, I certainly have no objection to their adoption alongside 
it.  Political gerrymandering is a wily enough foe that it may well take a 
set of standards to subdue.  
C.  Relation to Other Domains 
It should be clear by now that there are many similarities between 
the territorial community test and the existing bodies of state and fed-
eral law that regulate redistricting.  State legislative districts that corre-
spond to political subdivisions (which themselves often coincide with 
territorial communities) are permitted to deviate substantially from 
the population otherwise dictated by the one-person, one-vote rule.273  
Minority groups that constitute territorial communities are commonly 
entitled to districts in which they can elect the candidates of their 
choice under section 2 of the VRA.274  Majority-minority districts that 
mirror territorial communities are essentially immune from claims 
 
areas from [more rural] neighborhoods”); CAIN, supra note 22, at 63-64, 72 (discussing 
examples of California communities that could sensibly be combined by districts); Gard-
ner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1258-59 (suggesting that if a community 
must be divided, its “core” should be preserved and its “hinterlands” sacrificed). 
272 See supra subsections I.B.2-3.  To the extent that these approaches conflict with 
the territorial community test—if, for example, lower bias and higher responsiveness 
could be achieved only by disrupting more communities—I would want the value of 
community preservation to take precedence over other redistricting goals.  But I would 
have no problem with a district plan that complies with the territorial community test 
being struck down for other reasons. 
273 See supra subsection II.C.1. 
274 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
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that they are unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.275  And many states 
already abide by constitutional or statutory requirements that their 
districts respect territorial community boundaries.276 
Accordingly, were the territorial community test adopted as a 
means of curbing political gerrymandering, much of the law of redis-
tricting would be elegantly harmonized.  The same core inquiry—the 
degree to which electoral districts and territorial communities coin-
cide—would help determine:  (1) whether districts can diverge from 
perfect equipopulation; (2) whether section 2 of the VRA has been 
violated; (3) whether districts are unlawful racial gerrymanders; (4) 
whether certain state redistricting rules have been followed; and (5) 
whether impermissible political gerrymandering has taken place.  
Judges and scholars who value coherence in the law should welcome 
such doctrinal convergence, particularly given the confusion that has 
long reigned in the redistricting realm.277 
The benefits of convergence also would not be merely aesthetic.  
Parties responsible for crafting districts, who often complain about the 
plethora of applicable requirements, would have a single, straight-
forward directive with which to comply (in addition to the one-person, 
one-vote rule):  that districts should correspond as closely as possible 
to territorial communities.  As long as this mandate was satisfied, state 
legislative districts could deviate somewhat from perfect population 
equality, and all districts would be largely insulated from VRA section 
2, racial gerrymandering, certain state law, and political gerrymander-
ing challenges.  The legal uncertainty that surrounds most contempo-
rary district plans would be substantially reduced. 
As for the courts, they would presumably find fewer breaches of 
the redistricting rules once district drawers fully grasped the need for 
district-community congruence.  Districts designed to comply with the 
territorial community test, of course, would typically violate neither it 
nor any other requirement.  Moreover, when the courts did find 
breaches, they would often be able to avoid framing their decisions in 
 
275 See supra subsection II.C.3. 
276 See supra subsection II.C.5. 
277 See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text. 
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inflammatory racial terms.278  Much of the redistricting case law cur-
rently revolves around racial issues because several key causes of action 
(e.g., racial vote dilution and racial gerrymandering) are race-related.  
But since districts that offend section 2 of the VRA or the prohibition 
on racial gerrymandering also frequently run afoul of the territorial 
community test, they could be struck down, in many cases, on com-
munal grounds alone.  Incendiary claims about discrimination and 
racial motivation might thus be limited at the same time that the doc-
trine’s overall coherence would be enhanced. 
IV.  MEASURING MANAGEABILITY 
The Supreme Court’s rationale in Vieth and LULAC for rejecting 
all of the potential standards that it considered was not that it deemed 
them deficient on the merits.  The Court’s justification, rather, was 
that none of the standards was sufficiently “judicially discernible and 
manageable.”279  None of the standards, in other words, could give rise 
to decisions that would be “principled, rational, and based upon rea-
soned distinctions”—and therefore the whole field of political gerry-
mandering, according to the Vieth plurality, represented a 
nonjusticiable political question.280 
Vieth and LULAC impose a heavy burden on anyone who proposes 
a new standard for curbing political gerrymandering.  The standard 
not only must be sound as a matter of constitutional law, but, in con-
trast to the array of approaches the Court already has evaluated, it also 
must be judicially workable.  This burden is particularly weighty for the 
territorial community test since the objection most commonly posed 
to it is that community boundaries (let alone how well they match up 
with district lines) cannot be reliably determined.281 
This Part, then, takes on the challenge of demonstrating that the 
territorial community test is manageable.  I first argue that the test 
 
278 See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 638-41 (discussing “perverse incentives” created 
by Supreme Court decisions “encourag[ing] the racialization of all claims of improper 
manipulation of the redistricting process”). 
279 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also LULAC, 
548 U.S. 399, 417-20 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
280 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. 
281 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/9/2012 1:31 PM 
2012] Redistricting and the Territorial Community 1443 
 
avoids the problem that has led the Court to find every other ap-
proach wanting:  the judiciary’s alleged inability to assess partisan mo-
tives and outcomes.  I next discuss the courts’ experiences to date with 
standards similar to my own.  My conclusion is that both the Supreme 
Court and the state courts have had no particular difficulty ascertain-
ing community boundaries or comparing them to district configura-
tions.  I then explore the relevant political science literature, which 
also shows that communities can be identified and that district-
community congruence can be measured.  Finally, I contend that any 
remaining vagueness is actually beneficial because it would encourage 
risk-averse district drawers to avoid provocative district plans. 
A.  Sidestepping the Problem 
In both Vieth and LULAC, the Court dismissed as unmanageable all 
the standards that it considered for the same two reasons:  (1) they 
required the courts to make impossible evaluations of the political  
motives underlying district plans; or else (2) they asked the courts to 
decide whether specific electoral outcomes were sufficiently “fair.”  For 
instance, the predominant-partisan-intent tests advanced by appellants 
in both cases, as well as by Justice Stevens, were deemed unworkable 
because the Court could see no way to determine whether partisanship 
in fact outweighed all other redistricting considerations.282  Similarly, 
Justice Souter’s emphasis on partisans’ “packing” or “cracking,” and 
Justice Breyer’s minority-party-entrenchment standard, were consid-
ered untenable because people’s political affiliations are changeable 
and there is no way to tell how much power a party should have.283  
“‘Fairness,’” declared the Vieth plurality, “does not seem to us a judi-
cially manageable standard.”284 
Whatever one may think of these critiques, they plainly leave the 
territorial community test unscathed.  Unlike the standards assessed in 
Vieth and LULAC, it does not require the courts to determine how par-
 
282 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417-19 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-86, 
292-95 (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[C]ourts must be cautious about adopting a standard that turns on whether the parti-
san interests in the redistricting process were excessive.”). 
283 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286-90, 296-97, 299-301 (plurality opinion). 
284 Id. at 291. 
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tisan district drawers’ motives are—or even to adjudge intent at all.  
Also unlike those standards, it does not necessitate any analysis of vot-
ers’ political affiliations or parties’ levels of electoral success.  Instead, 
the territorial community test focuses exclusively on where geographic 
communities are located and how well electoral districts correspond to 
them.  These sorts of questions, which avoid partisan motives and out-
comes altogether, have never been held by the Court to be judicially 
unanswerable.  They are nowhere to be found in the “sea of impon-
derables” bemoaned by the Vieth plurality.285 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Experience 
Not only has the Court never declared the territorial community 
test to be unworkable, but it has successfully employed something simi-
lar to it in a wide range of cases.  In these decisions, the Court has fre-
quently, and without any obvious hardship, identified the bound-aries 
of geographic communities and reached well-reasoned conclusions as 
to whether they were disrupted by district plans.  While these conclu-
sions have not always been unanimous, no Justice has ever complained 
that the inquiry itself is somehow beyond the judiciary’s ability.  The 
Court’s own experience thus provides compelling evidence that the 
territorial community test is manageable. 
In the reapportionment context, first, at least five of the Court’s 
decisions have determined that towns or counties comprised distinct 
communities, and that districts corresponding to these units could, for 
this reason, diverge substantially from perfect population equality.286  
While the Justices have disagreed as to whether population deviations 
should be allowed in the first place, no Justice has claimed that it is 
impossible to tell whether political subdivisions amount to genuine 
communities.  Even Justice Brennan, the Court’s most ardent champi-
on of the one-person, one-vote rule, conceded in a 1983 opinion that a 
“longstanding policy of using counties as the basic units of representa-
tion” could be applied “rational[ly]” and without “arbitrariness or dis-
crimination.”287 
 
285 Id. at 290. 
286 See supra subsection II.C.1. 
287 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 853 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Similarly, the Court has considered whether minority groups con-
stitute territorial communities (and hence require districts of their 
own) in close to ten racial vote dilution cases.288  These decisions have 
split almost evenly between holdings in favor of and holdings against 
the minority groups.  In some of the decisions in their favor, the Court 
recognized territorial communities such as Mexican American resi-
dents of San Antonio’s Barrio,289 poor African Americans in rural 
Georgia,290 and politically mobilized Latinos in southwestern Texas.291  
In some of the adverse decisions, the Court held that assorted minori-
ties around Minneapolis,292 and geographically scattered African Amer-
icans in Georgia,293 North Carolina,294 and Texas,295 did not qualify as 
coherent communities.  Never in any of these cases did the Court ex-
press any existential angst about the inquiry it was conducting.  In-
deed, in a recent vote dilution decision, the Justices were able both to 
ascertain the boundaries of a Texas Latino community, and to con-
clude that the old district lines corresponded to them while the new 
lines did not.296  If this sort of analysis is unworkable, there is no hint of 
it in the case law. 
Nor is there any sign of trouble in the Court’s racial gerrymander-
ing decisions, of which another ten or so have examined whether dis-
tricts coincided with territorial communities in order to assess claims 
that the districts were created for primarily racial reasons.297  In these 
decisions too, the Court repeatedly has shown itself capable of evaluat-
ing community boundaries as well as district-community congruence.  
For instance, the Court struck down a North Carolina district that 
combined African Americans from across the state,298 a Georgia district 
 
288 See supra subsection II.C.2.  
289 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-70 (1973).  
290 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626-27 (1982). 
291 See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 435, 438-41 (2006). 
292 See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993). 
293 See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1997). 
294 See Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899, 916-18 (1996). 
295 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979-81 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
296 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435, 438-41. 
297 See supra subsection II.C.3. 
298 See Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630, 647-49 (1993). 
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that joined blacks in inland cities and rural coastal areas,299 and racially 
homogeneous Texas districts carved out of racially integrated re-
gions.300  On the other hand, the Court upheld a Tampa Bay district 
composed of poor urban African Americans301 and a revised North 
Carolina district that confined itself to urban centers in the Pied-
mont.302  Nothing would seem to differentiate these cases (at least in 
terms of judicial manageability) from the rest of the Court’s equal pro-
tection docket.  Their outcomes, reflecting the consistent application 
of something akin to the territorial community test, appear just as 
“principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions”303 as those 
of any other constitutional cases. 
To be sure, the Justices have sometimes disagreed about questions 
of community in these decisions.  In Bush, for example, Justice Stevens 
argued in dissent that the Dallas district rejected by the Court in fact 
had been “drawn to align with certain communities of interest, such as 
land use, family demographics, and transportation corridors.”304  The 
plurality was unpersuaded because the legislature had not considered 
this information when it drew the district and the district correlated 
better with racial than community lines.305  In LULAC, similarly, Chief 
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the State’s proposed re-
medial district (which the majority disallowed) was just as attentive to 
Texas Latino communities as the original district that the state dis-
mantled.306  The majority conceded that the districts were similar in 
several respects, but held that the original district corresponded to a 
more politically cohesive Latino group.307   
For present purposes, it is unimportant who had the better of these 
disputes.  The key point, rather, is that they are no different from the 
disagreements that characterize all non-unanimous Court decisions.  
 
299 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908-09, 919-20 (1995). 
300 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 966, 971 n.*, 975. 
301 See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-83 (1997). 
302 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 544, 553-54 (1999). 
303 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
304 Bush, 517 U.S. at 1026 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
305 See id. at 966-67 (plurality opinion). 
306 LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 504-05 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
307 See id. at 435, 438-41 (majority opinion). 
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As with any standard less determinate than one-person, one-vote, 
judges applying the territorial community test will occasionally reach 
different conclusions with regard to the same sets of facts.  But this 
reality does not make the test unmanageable; it simply makes it par for 
the constitutional course. 
C.  The State Courts’ Experience 
A skeptic might point out that almost all of the Court’s experience 
with the territorial community test has involved racial communities.  
Perhaps these communities are easier to identify and to compare to 
district lines than communities oriented along other axes.  The skeptic 
might add that district-community congruence is not the central issue in 
either racial vote dilution or racial gerrymandering doctrine.  Perhaps 
the Court would have more trouble with the territorial community test 
if it were the dispositive inquiry rather than a subsidiary consideration. 
These (perfectly valid) concerns are largely allayed by the experi-
ences of the state courts.  In a series of cases spanning four decades, 
these courts have frequently recognized geographic communities that 
were defined by non-racial criteria.  They also have repeatedly exam-
ined whether districts corresponded to these communities—not as a 
subprong of some other standard, but rather as the core element of 
their political gerrymandering analysis.  The body of doctrine pro-
duced by these decisions is substantively rich; it has led to both the 
affirmation and invalidation of challenged districts (usually unani-
mously); it has evolved, in classic common law fashion, through the 
refinement of earlier precedent; and it has almost never been de-
nounced as unworkable. 
By my count, courts in at least ten states, in at least twenty-two de-
cisions over the past four redistricting cycles, have evaluated at least 
fifty districts based on their congruence with territorial communities.308  
About two-thirds of these districts were upheld, while about one-third 
were struck down.309  About two-thirds of the decisions also were unan-
 
308 See supra subsection II.C.5. 
309 See supra subsection II.C.5.  
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imous, while only three were decided even in part by bare majorities.310  
That so many districts have been assessed under the territorial com-
munity test, yielding both affirmations and invalidations, and typically 
by lopsided margins, strongly suggests that the test is judicially man-
ageable.311  An unmanageable approach, in all likelihood, would not 
have survived as long or generated as much consensus with regard to 
results on both sides of the doctrinal line.312 
A closer examination of the state case law sheds light on the fac-
tors that most often prove decisive for districts’ fates.  That such gen-
eralizations are possible itself bolsters the case for the test’s workability.  
On the one hand, districts typically were struck down when it was clear 
to the reviewing courts that they merged unrelated communities or 
divided what plainly were unified communities.  Some examples of 
community fusion and fragmentation were noted earlier.313  Others in-
clude an Alaska district that joined the “physically and economically 
segregated” town of Cordova with the Inside Passage region;314 another 
Alaska district that “mixe[d] small, rural, Native communities with the 
urban areas of Ketchikan and Sitka”;315 two Denver districts that “split[] 
the Five Points community along its main business route”;316 and two 
North Carolina districts that separated a county seat from the rest of 
the jurisdiction.317  In many of these cases, the state was unable to pro-
duce any proof that community boundaries had been respected (or 
 
310 See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1983) (3-2 majority); In re 
Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1992) (one out of seven 
challenged districts upheld by 4-3 majority); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hart-
land, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323 (Vt. 1993) (one out of five challenged dis-
tricts struck down by 3-2 majority). 
311 As does the fact that both state and lower federal courts have frequently drawn 
districts so that they correspond to territorial communities.  See supra note 211. 
312 Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280-81 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding 
Bandemer standard unmanageable in part because it always resulted in districts being 
upheld). 
313 See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text. 
314 Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215. 
315 Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 51 (Alaska 1993). 
316 In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Colo. 1982). 
317 Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 253-54 (N.C. 2003).  
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even considered).318  Often, it was apparent that the basis for the state’s 
district drawing choices had been political advantage rather than 
community preservation.319 
Conversely, the state courts have generally upheld districts when 
there was reasonable evidence of district-community congruence and 
this evidence was actually taken into account by the redistricting body.  
Some common types of evidence have included shared economic pur-
suits, similar income levels, significant social and commercial interac-
tion, good transportation links, reliance on the same media outlets, 
and common membership in regional organizations.320  Presented with 
such evidence, the courts have typically rejected gerrymandering chal-
lenges even when the plaintiffs were able to mount plausible cases of 
community disruption.321  The courts have emphasized, however, that 
the evidence should have been compiled and consulted at the time the 
districts were formed—not introduced later in the heat of litigation.  It 
was significant in a number of cases that the district drawers them-
selves considered community boundaries and gave reasons for their 
actions.322  Absent such a contemporaneous record, the districts may 
well have been struck down. 
 
318 See, e.g., Hickel, 846 P.2d at 53-54 (noting that district was drawn with “little con-
sideration of the relative socio-economic integration of the people who live there”); 
Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215 (pointing out that “record [was] simply devoid of evidence” 
that communities were related); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 
P.2d 185, 195-96 (Colo. 1992) (concluding that Colorado Reapportionment Commis-
sion could not provide “adequate factual showing” for its districting choices). 
319 See, e.g., Hickel, 846 P.2d at 51 (asserting that district plan raised “specter of gerry-
mandering”); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 213 (Colo. 
1982) (noting “partisan political nature of the Commission’s action”). 
320 See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. 
321 See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1362-63 (Alaska 1987) 
(upholding district despite constituent areas’ “minimal” interaction because of their 
economic ties, transport links, and shared media outlets); In re Reapportionment of 
Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Vt. 2004) (same where “peti-
tioners’ preferences and the bulk of their interests may indeed fall outside their cur-
rent district” but “findings also include substantial ties” within district). 
322 See, e.g., In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d at 197; In re Petition 
of Stephan, 836 P.2d 574, 581-82 (Kan. 1992); Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972, 981-
85 (Or. 2001); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 
624 A.2d 323, 339-45 (Vt. 1993). 
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A different kind of confirmation of the territorial community test’s 
manageability can be gleaned from the case law of Alaska (the state with 
the most extensive experience with it).  Over four decades, in quintes-
sential common law fashion, the Alaskan courts have cited their earlier 
precedents, refined them, and relied on them to determine the out-
comes that different fact patterns should produce.  That the territorial 
community test can generate such a familiar sort of doctrine shows that 
it is no more vague or indeterminate than most legal standards. 
The Alaska Supreme Court first used the test in 1974, permitting 
population deviations for districts that coincided with communities 
and prohibiting them for districts that did not.323  In the court’s next 
redistricting decision, in 1983, it looked to its earlier case for the ap-
plicable standard of review as well as the definition of the relevant 
constitutional provision.324  Four years later, the court carefully ana-
lyzed its earlier precedents to decide how to resolve challenges to 
three districts.  Noting that district validity “can be determined by way 
of comparison with districts which we have previously [examined],” 
the court concluded that a district combining two Anchorage suburbs 
was “[u]nlike the district linking Cordova and the Southeast which we 
invalidated in [1983],” but “[l]ike the Juneau District upheld in 
[1974].”325  By 1992, the court had an even deeper pool of precedents 
to draw from—deep enough that it could start specifying the hall-
marks of sound and unsound districts.  “In our previous reapportion-
ment decisions we have identified several specific characteristics of 
[permissible districts],” the court explained, cataloging factors such as 
“common major economic activity,” “the predominantly Native charac-
ter of the populace,” “historical economic links,” and “transportation 
ties.”326  Through the alchemy of the common law, a delphic constitu-
tional command had become a detailed doctrinal infrastructure for 
deciding cases. 
 
323 See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879-80 (Alaska 1974). 
324 See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1214 (Alaska 1983). 
325 Kenai, 743 P.2d at 1363; see also id. at 1360 (contrasting unified Juneau district 
with “the division of relatively similar districts in Anchorage that we rejected in Groh”); 
id. at 1361 (“Like the Juneau District upheld in Groh,  District 2 effectuates a rational 
state policy . . . .”). 
326 Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska 1992); see also In re 2001 
Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002) (citing Hickel, 846 P.2d at 51 n.20). 
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Some further support for the territorial community test’s workabil-
ity stems from the kinds of disagreements that it has produced.  As 
noted above, courts applying the test have not disagreed much; most 
decisions have been unanimous and only a handful have deeply divid-
ed the reviewing judges.327  When judges have come to different con-
clusions, moreover, they usually have done so for the most ordinary of 
reasons:  diverging views on whether certain facts satisfy a legal stand-
ard.  An Alaska judge, for example, objected to a district’s invalidation 
because, while a “close question,” he thought “it seem[ed] relatively 
reasonable to include Cordova with the other waterlocked fishing 
communities.”328  Similarly, Colorado judges quarreled over whether 
the division of certain communities was unavoidable due to the one-
person, one-vote rule (while agreeing that the division was regrett-
able).329  Only once, in the case law that I surveyed, did I find any claim 
that the territorial community test is particularly difficult to apply.  A 
Vermont judge labeled it “vague and tentative” and criticized its 
“breadth and imprecision”—but nevertheless used it to analyze the 
validity of six districts, dissenting only as to one.330 
D.  The Political Science Literature 
While the courts’ own experiences are the most persuasive proof 
of the territorial community test’s manageability, the political science 
literature offers some additional confirmation.  Political scientists have 
managed to identify geographic communities both directly, through 
the analysis of large volumes of socioeconomic and survey data, and 
indirectly, through the use of proxies such as political subdivisions and 
media markets.  Political scientists also have successfully quantified 
district-community congruence, again utilizing the subdivision and 
 
327 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
328 Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1222 (Compton, J., dissenting). 
329 See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 210-11 (Colo. 
1992) (Mullarky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
330 In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 
323, 349 (Vt. 1993) (Dooley, J., concurring and dissenting).  It is worth noting that the 
Vermont statute is more “vague” and “imprecis[e]” than my conception of the territo-
rial community test.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1903(b)(2) (2002) (requiring districts 
to be drawn to achieve “recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social 
interaction, trade, political ties and common interests”). 
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market proxies.  These techniques demonstrate that the territorial 
community test can be employed not just qualitatively but also with 
some social scientific rigor.331 
An important effort to identify communities directly was recently 
completed by Dante Chinni and James Gimpel.332  Chinni and Gimpel 
compiled extensive demographic and socioeconomic data for every 
county in America:  population size, population density, income, oc-
cupation, education, race, ethnicity, age distribution, religion, etc.333  
They then used a statistical procedure to assign each county to one of 
twelve community types.334  These community types, which capture 
much of the country’s diversity, include fast-growing “Boom Towns,” 
university-focused “Campus and Careers,” deeply religious “Evangelical 
Epicenters,” Hispanic-heavy “Immigration Nation,” urban “Industrial 
Metropolis,” struggling “Service Worker Centers,” and agrarian “Tractor 
Country.”335  That counties can methodically be classified in this manner 
helps show that the task of community identification is tractable. 
Equally promising is the CommonCensus Map Project, which asks 
respondents to provide their home addresses as well as the “local 
community,” “local area,” and major city with which they identify most 
closely.336  Complex algorithms then convert the information into fas-
cinating maps (available at local, regional, and national scales) of 
America’s geographic communities, as specified and experienced by 
 
331 Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?  Social Science and 
Voting in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2002) (“Law and social science are per-
haps nowhere more mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field.”).  
332 See DANTE CHINNI & JAMES GIMPEL, OUR PATCHWORK NATION:  THE SURPRISING 
TRUTH ABOUT THE “REAL” AMERICA (2010).  In a sequel to this Article, I also attempt to 
identify communities directly using newly available Census data as well as specialized 
mapping software.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32. 
333 See CHINNI & GIMPEL, supra note 332, at 222-23. 
334 See id. at 223-25. 
335 See id. at 9-10.  The twelve composite variables used to sort the country’s coun-
ties explain seventy to eighty percent of the variance in the underlying data.  Id. at 224; 
see also Brian A. Mikelbank, A Typology of U.S. Suburban Places, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
935, 961 (2004) (using similar statistical technique to assign U.S. suburbs to ten differ-
ent categories); Thomas J. Vicino et al., Megalopolis 50 Years On:  The Transformation of a 
City Region, 31 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 344, 361-64 (2007) (assigning Census 
places in Northeast to five categories).  
336 About, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus.org/about. 
php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
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the people themselves.337  While more data is necessary to create maps 
that are detailed enough for redistricting,338 the idea of ascertaining 
community boundaries through people’s own subjective affiliations is 
potentially very powerful. 
Political scientists have also used less precise proxies to determine 
community borders:  political subdivisions such as towns,339 counties,340 
and school districts,341 and media markets for television stations342 and 
newspapers.343  These entities have the advantage of being easily dis-
cernible; political subdivision boundaries can be seen on any map, 
while groups such as Nielsen Media Research and Arbitron define 
media markets in spatial terms.  The entities have the disadvantage, of 
course, of not coinciding perfectly with territorial communities; as 
noted earlier, the patterns of people’s interests and affiliations do not 
 
337 See The Maps Page, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus. 
org/maps.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); see also Matt Chisholm & Ross Cohen, 
NEIGHBORHOOD PROJECT, http://hood.theory.org (similar San Francisco project) (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2012); cf. Claudia J. Coulton et al., Mapping Residents’ Perceptions of Neigh-
borhood Boundaries:  A Methodological Note, 29 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 371, 371-72 
(2001) (discussing pilot study mapping Cleveland neighborhoods by surveying their 
residents). 
338 See FAQ, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus.org/faq.php 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
339 See Richard G. Niemi et al., The Effects of Congruity Between Community and District 
on Salience of U.S. House Candidates, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 187, 198-99 (1986). 
340 See Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 65, 74-75 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005); Jonathan Winburn & Mi-
chael W. Wagner, Carving Voters Out:  Redistricting’s Influence on Political Information, 
Turnout, and Voting Behavior, 63 POL. RES. Q. 373, 375 (2010). 
341 Cf. William A. Fischel, Neither “Creatures of the State” nor “Accidents of Geography”:  
The Creation of American Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
177, 199 (2010). 
342 See PAUL GRONKE, THE ELECTORATE, THE CAMPAIGN, AND THE OFFICE:  A UNIFIED 
APPROACH TO SENATE AND HOUSE ELECTIONS 165-69 (2000); C. DANIELLE VINSON,  
LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS:  THROUGH LOCAL EYES 25 
(2003); James E. Campbell et al., Television Markets and Congressional Elections, 9 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 665, 668-69 (1984); Dena Levy & Peverill Squire, Television Markets and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. House Elections, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 313, 316 (2000); Daniel 
Lipinski, The Effect of Messages Communicated by Members of Congress:  The Impact of Publiciz-
ing Votes, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 81, 88-91 (2001); Timothy S. Prinz, Media Markets and Can-
didate Awareness in House Elections, 1978–1990, 12 POL. COMM. 305, 307 (1995). 
343 See Brian F. Schaffner & Patrick J. Sellers, The Structural Determinants of Local Con-
gressional News Coverage, 20 POL. COMM. 41, 46-47 (2003). 
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always match up with lines drawn for other reasons.344  Still, both polit-
ical subdivisions and media markets are useful starting points for any 
attempt to determine community borders, and it is unsurprising that 
courts conducting such an inquiry often have relied on—but not lim-
ited themselves to—them.345 
Unfortunately, Chinni and Gimpel did not try to analyze how well 
electoral districts correspond to their twelve community types, nor has 
the CommonCensus Map Project compared constituencies to people’s 
self-identified communities.  Helpfully, however, many of the scholars 
who used political subdivisions or media markets as proxies for geo-
graphic communities also assessed district-subdivision or district-
market congruence.  Using a variety of statistical techniques, they 
managed to quantify the level of congruence of congressional districts 
across the country, typically on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high).346   
That this sort of measurement can be done is quite significant.  It 
means that a challenged district’s congruence can be calculated relia-
bly, and then compared to the congruence of other districts in the state 
(or nation).  While political subdivisions and media markets are not 
identical to territorial communities, particularly incongruent districts 
are still more likely to disrupt communities, and particularly congru-
ent districts are still more likely to respect them.  At the very least, it is 
probative whether a district does or does not correspond to subdivi-
sions or markets as well as most of its peers.  Courts employing the ter-
ritorial community test, then, could use comparative congruence data 
to bolster their qualitative analysis.  The result, presumably, would be 
case outcomes that are more consistent and predictable—and doctrine 
that is more judicially manageable.347 
 
344 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra subsection II.C.5 and Section IV.C (discussing relevant state case law); 
see also Jason C. Miller, Community as a Redistricting Principle:  Consulting Media Markets in 
Drawing District Lines, 86 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 6 (2010), http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/ 
86/86_JMiller.pdf (arguing that courts should consult media market boundaries when 
evaluating district plans). 
346 See GRONKE, supra note 342, at 165-69; Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 668-70; 
Engstrom, supra note 340, at 74; Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 316-17; Niemi et al., 
supra note 339, at 192-99; Schaffner & Sellers, supra note 343, at 43; Winburn & Wag-
ner, supra note 340, at 376-77. 
347 Cf. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 563-74 (compiling comparative compactness 
data for congressional districts that was later relied on by Supreme Court racial gerry-
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E.  Lingering Ambiguity 
Of course, neither the courts’ experiences nor the efforts of the 
political scientists can eliminate all uncertainty regarding the applica-
tion of the territorial community test.  No matter how many cases are 
decided under it, and no matter how sophisticated the social scientific 
measures become, judges will still need to make tough judgment calls 
about community boundaries and district-community congruence.  
This remaining imprecision, however, is not necessarily undesirable.  
If the Court’s history with racial gerrymandering is any guide, some 
lingering ambiguity could actually prove useful by prompting district 
drawers to play it safe and avoid provocative district plans. 
When the Court first announced in 1993 that districts are invalid if 
they are drawn for predominantly racial reasons,348 the new standard 
was attacked at once for its vagueness.349  Critics noted that legislative 
intent is very difficult to discern, and that it is more challenging still to 
determine whether race overwhelmed all other redistricting consider-
ations.  Early returns seemed to bear out these fears.  The Court took 
case after case in the new doctrinal field, dividing bitterly almost every 
time and reaching outcomes that were not easy to reconcile with one 
another.  By the end of the 1990s, as Justice Souter put it, there was 
widespread “confusion in statehouses and courthouses” thanks to the 
absence of a “practical standard for distinguishing between the lawful 
and unlawful use of race.”350 
But something funny happened in the next redistricting cycle:  the 
number of racial gerrymandering challenges plummeted, and almost 
every such challenge—including the only one considered by the 
Court—failed.351  As Richard Pildes has explained, risk-averse district 
drawers, hoping to avoid litigation, largely stopped forming strangely 
 
mandering decisions).  A sequel to this Article attempts to measure district-community 
congruence directly rather than through proxies such as political subdivisions or media 
markets.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32. 
348 See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
349 See, e.g., id. at 670-74 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 685-87 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 645. 
350 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1045 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
351 See Pildes, supra note 21, at 67 & n.174; see also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 
257-58 (2001). 
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shaped majority-minority districts.  They “internalized Shaw, not as 
barring them from intentionally creating [majority-]minority districts, 
but as imposing general, extrinsic limits on the extent to which dis-
tricts could be noncompact.”352  The aesthetics of majority-minority 
districts thus improved, litigation declined precipitously, and “vague 
law was transformed into settled practice.”353 
Though it is impossible to say for sure, a similar story could unfold 
if the territorial community test were adopted.  At first, court decisions 
might be highly controversial, many districts might seem to be in jeop-
ardy, and complaints about the test’s unworkability might abound.  
But over time, as in the racial gerrymandering context, risk-averse dis-
trict drawers would likely internalize the new rule and learn how to 
steer clear of litigation.  They might form districts that adhere closely 
to political subdivisions, or assemble detailed data in order to identify 
community boundaries, or document in writing the reasons for their 
redistricting choices—all steps not strictly necessary for avoiding liabil-
ity.  In this manner, the territorial community test might end up both 
sparsely litigated and strictly enforced thanks to its residual ambiguity.  
And while heavy enforcement has its drawbacks in other areas, it is 
relatively unproblematic when the activity being curtailed (without 
excessive judicial involvement) is political gerrymandering.354 
V.  PLAYING POLITICS 
If the most common objection to the territorial community test is 
that it is judicially unmanageable,355 claims that it would harm Demo-
crats and racial minorities and reduce competitiveness come in a close 
second.356  The assumptions underlying these criticisms are that Demo-
 
352 Pildes, supra note 21, at 68. 
353 Id. at 67-69. 
354 See id. at 70 (“[U]nlike gerrymandering in the Shaw context, partisan gerryman-
dering raises no concern about overenforcement costs.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen, The 
Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection 
Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1489, 1503 (2002) (calling for more judicially unmanage-
able election law standards). 
355 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
356 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 289 (2004) (plurality opinion); BUCH-
MAN, supra note 22, at 202; Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1693; Lowenstein & Steinberg, 
supra note 16, at 23; Shapiro, supra note 43, at 238.  It should be noted, however, that 
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cratic and minority voters are especially spatially concentrated, and that 
most geographic communities are skewed in a particular party’s favor.  
The formation of districts that coincide with communities, then, would 
allegedly “pack” Democrats and minorities and render most districts 
uncompetitive. 
Arguments of this sort, focusing on statewide electoral consequen-
ces, have only limited bearing on whether the territorial community test 
should be adopted.  As laid out in the preceding Parts, my case for the 
test is theoretical, historical, and doctrinal—but not overtly political.  
That the test may unintentionally help or hurt a party or racial group, or 
make elections more or less competitive, is largely irrelevant to its legal 
merit.  Electoral impact, of course, is not a recognized modality of 
constitutional interpretation.357 
Nevertheless, it is plainly good policy for district plans to treat parties 
and racial groups fairly and for election outcomes to be responsive to 
changes in public opinion.  Accordingly, this Part considers the likely 
political implications of the territorial community test’s adoption—
and concludes that they are actually quite positive.  I first investigate 
how partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, minority representation, 
and other key variables relate to district-community congruence.  Con-
trary to critics’ expectations, preliminary empirical analysis shows that 
bias is lower, responsiveness is higher, and minority representation is 
unchanged in states that respect community boundaries when they 
redistrict.  I then examine the relevant political science literature, 
which largely confirms these findings and extends them in several in-
teresting ways.  Thus not only does the territorial community test not 
injure any party or racial group or reduce competitiveness, but, based on 
the available evidence, it appears to do the opposite.  
A.  Empirical Analysis 
In the last redistricting cycle (2001–2010), almost half the states 
were required or encouraged to draft state legislative district plans that 
 
most of these criticisms are directed at district compactness, which is not the same thing 
as district-community congruence.  See supra subsection I.B.1. 
357 See BOBBITT, supra note 219, at 12-13 (summarizing modalities of constitutional 
argument). 
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adhered to territorial community boundaries.358  Of the twenty-two 
community-respect provisions that were in force, four were constitu-
tional, seven were statutory, and eleven were included in non-binding 
guidelines.359  Courts in six states had also issued decisions specifically 
addressing these provisions before the last cycle began.360  In this Sec-
tion, I analyze how states that paid heed to community boundaries 
over the last decade differed, along several important metrics, from 
states that did not.  My results help rebut many of the politically rooted 
criticisms of the territorial community test. 
It is true, of course, that states with community-respect provisions 
on their books do not necessarily abide by them.  Districts might fail to 
correspond to underlying geographic communities even if corre-
spondence is nominally urged or even mandated.361  Still, the presence 
of a community-respect requirement is at least a decent proxy for actual 
district-community congruence.  Particularly when such a requirement 
is legally binding (because it is included in a constitution or statute 
rather than a hortatory guideline), and even more so when it previously 
has been judicially enforced, one would expect it to have a discernible 
effect on how closely districts and communities in a state coincide.362  
 
358 I examine state legislative rather than congressional elections because (1) many 
community-respect provisions apply only to the former; and (2) the smaller number of 
congressional districts in most states makes congressional bias and responsiveness cal-
culations less reliable. 
359 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.  California is not counted here 
because it has not redrawn districts since it adopted its community-respect provision in 
2008.  Kentucky is not counted because its community-respect provision applies only to 
congressional redistricting (though I do count it in the turnout and trust-in-
government analyses, which are not limited to state elections).  North Carolina and 
Rhode Island are not counted because they do not have explicit community-respect 
provisions.  See supra note 192.  The states that are counted are reasonably representa-
tive of the country as a whole, covering all major geographic regions as well as a wide 
array of demographic and socioeconomic environments. 
360 They are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Oregon, and Vermont.  See supra 
notes 201, 203, 205-06, 208, 210 and accompanying text. 
361 See Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Institutions and Competition in U.S. House 
Districts (“It may be that despite these criteria being on the books, there is little en-
forcement of them . . . .”), in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT:  MAKING INSTITU-
TIONS WORK 141, 153 (Margaret Levi et al. eds, 2008). 
362 See, e.g., Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Represen-
tation, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 422 (2004) (treating states’ compactness and subdivi-
sion preservation requirements as proxies for actual district compactness and respect 
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It is also true that the territorial community test does not directly 
target bias, responsiveness, or minority representation.  The goal of 
the test is concededly to optimize district-community congruence, not 
to accomplish other laudable policy objectives.  However, that the ap-
proach may influence the electoral system indirectly (by sharply limit-
ing the discretion of district drawers363) and somewhat coincidentally 
(because districts that coincide with communities often happen to 
correlate with desirable statewide attributes) is no reason to discount 
these consequences.  Positive side effects are still positive. 
1.  Bias and Responsiveness 
Beginning with bias and responsiveness, political scientists Bruce 
Cain and John Hanley calculated both metrics for fifty legislative 
chambers in twenty-six states based on the results of the 2002 elec-
tions.364  As noted earlier, partisan bias refers to the divergence in the 
share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the 
statewide vote.365  For example, if Democrats would win 48% of the 
seats with 50% of the vote (in which case Republicans would win 52% 
of the seats), then a district plan would have a bias of 2%.  Electoral 
responsiveness refers to the rate at which a party gains or loses seats 
given changes in its statewide vote share.  For instance, if Democrats 
would win 10% more seats if they received 5% more of the vote, then a 
 
for subdivisions); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 529-31 (same for compactness).  It 
would be even better, of course, to assess the impact of district-community congruence 
directly rather than through proxies such as state legal provisions.  A sequel to this Article 
attempts such direct assessment.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32. 
363 In a recent article, Adam Cox and Richard Holden argue that the optimal gerry-
mandering strategy for a party is “to match slices of voters from opposite tails of the 
[partisan] distribution” such that the party’s own die-hard supporters in a district 
slightly outnumber the opposing party’s committed partisans.  Adam B. Cox & Richard 
T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 567 
(2011).  This “matching slices” strategy plainly cannot be executed when districts must 
correspond to geographic communities.  A requirement of district-community congru-
ence thus renders unavailable the most potent political gerrymanders. 
364 This data is on file with the author.  The 2002 elections were the first to be held 
during the 2000s redistricting cycle, and are thus particularly relevant for purposes of 
bias and responsiveness.  The twenty-six states that Cain and Hanley analyzed account 
for about 75% of the country’s population. 
365 See supra notes 33, 76 and accompanying text. 
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plan would have a responsiveness of 2.0.366  In general, the lower a 
plan’s bias, and the higher its responsiveness, the better the plan is.367 
As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, bias was markedly lower and respon-
siveness was markedly higher in the states that paid heed to territorial 
communities in the last redistricting cycle.  Specifically, average bias 
was 4.0 percentage points lower (5.4% versus 9.4%), while average re-
sponsiveness was higher by 0.40 (1.43 versus 1.03).368  All the subcate-
gories of states with community-respect provisions—i.e., states with 
constitutional or statutory requirements, states with non-binding 
guidelines, and states with prior relevant court decisions—also scored 
better than the states with no such provisions.  The differences in bias 
and responsiveness were statistically significant as well.369  And while 
adherence to community boundaries did not remain a significant pre-
dictor of bias and responsiveness when I controlled for other common 
redistricting criteria370 and aspects of states’ redistricting environ-
ments,371 the magnitude and direction of the variable’s coefficients 
 
366 See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redis-
tricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 544-45 (1994) (defining bias and responsiveness). 
367 Reducing bias all the way to zero is unproblematic.  However, very high rates of 
responsiveness are undesirable because they result in large changes in seat shares de-
spite only small shifts in vote shares.  Fortunately, the responsiveness scores reported 
here are not nearly high enough to raise such concerns. 
368 These figures are for mean bias and responsiveness.  Median bias was 2.5 per-
centage points lower (5.9% versus 8.4%), while median responsiveness was 0.33 higher 
(1.34 versus 1.01). 
369 Differences were assessed at the 5% significance level. 
370 I coded community respect as an ordinal variable with the following possible 
values:  0 if a state had no community-respect provision, 1 if a state had a non-binding 
community-respect guideline, 2 if a state had a constitutional or statutory community-
respect provision, and 3 if a state had a prior applicable court decision.  Because I ex-
pected (and found) largely linear relationships between community respect and the 
various dependent variables, I did not convert community respect into dummy varia-
bles.  The redistricting criteria for which I controlled were compactness, preservation 
of political subdivisions, and preservation of the cores of prior districts.  I obtained data 
on these criteria from the NCSL and coded them all as dummy variables.  See NCSL 
GUIDE, supra note 193, at 106-08 & tbl.8.  All the regressions I ran for this Article used 
ordinary least squares.  For regression results, see the Appendix.    
371 The aspects for which I controlled were whether a state used a redistricting 
commission, whether a party had unified control of a state government at the time of 
redistricting, and whether courts ended up drawing a state’s district maps.  I coded all 
of these aspects as dummy variables.  I obtained commission data from NCSL GUIDE, 
supra note 193, at 161-62; data on unified party control from Carl Klarner, Klarner Data, 
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continued to be consistent with the above results.  Controlling for all 
these factors, a shift from no community-respect provision at all to the 
most stringent (i.e., judicial) enforcement of such a provision was as-
sociated with a fall in bias of 3.3 percentage points and a rise in re-
sponsiveness of 0.26. 
This analysis, while preliminary, tends to refute the claims that the 
territorial community test would disadvantage either major party or 
make elections less competitive.  In fact, the test’s implications for bias 
and responsiveness seem to be not just neutral but actually somewhat 
favorable.  In the last redistricting cycle, states that respected commu-
nity boundaries when they redrew their district maps treated the major 
parties more fairly, and held elections that were more responsive to 
changes in public opinion, than states that did not.  These findings 
should help allay misgivings about the potential impact of district-
community congruence on the American electoral system.  Based on 
the available evidence, such congruence would likely make the system 
better—a bit less skewed in either party’s favor and a bit more respon-
sive to the views of the public—not worse.372 
  
 
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. (2007), http://academic.udayton.edu/sppq-TPR/klarner_datapage. 
html; and data on court-drawn plans from Jonathan Winburn, Comparing Redistricting 
Outcomes Across the States:  A Comparison of Commission, Court, and Legislative 
Plans 24 tbl.4 (Mar. 3-4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www. 
kpsaweb.org/Hughes/Winburn.RedistrictingOutcomes.pdf. 
372 Data for the remaining twenty-four states and for the rest of the 2000s redistrict-
ing cycle would help confirm these conclusions.  So too would analysis based directly 
on district-community congruence rather than proxies for it.  See supra note 362; see also 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript at 55-57) (finding that district-community 
congruence has a curvilinear relationship with bias and a positive relationship with 
responsiveness). 
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Figure 1:  Average Partisan Bias by State Category 
 
Figure 2:  Average Electoral Responsiveness by State Category 
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2.  Minority Representation 
Turning next to minority representation, I used Census data to es-
timate the number of majority-minority districts in each state legisla-
tive chamber during the last redistricting cycle.373  I defined a majority-
minority district as one in which any racial minority made up more 
than 50% of the population.374  I then calculated the difference be-
tween each state’s proportion of majority-minority districts (averaged 
over both its chambers) and its minority population percentage.375  For 
example, if a state had 15% majority-minority districts and a minority 
population of 20%, then the gap for the state was 5%.  The smaller 
this gap, the better representation minorities presumably received.376 
As Figure 3 indicates, states that paid heed to community bounda-
ries when they last redistricted had a slightly smaller difference between 
their proportions of majority-minority districts and their minority popu-
lation percentages.  Specifically, the gap in these states was 2.7 percent-
age points lower (10.8% versus 13.5%).377  In other words, minorities 
appeared to receive slightly better legislative representation, relative to 
their share of the overall state population, in community-respecting 
states.  The difference between the two categories of states was not 
 
373 See United States Census 2000:  State Legislative District Summary Files, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU ( Jan. 4, 2007), http://www.census.gov/census2000/sld_sumfiles.html.  I did 
not consider coalition or influence districts because of the fierce ongoing debates over 
how to identify them and how to evaluate them relative to majority-minority districts.  
Cf. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009) (holding that only majority-
minority districts can ever be required under section 2 of the VRA).  
374 Unfortunately, the Census data did not specify minority groups’ shares of the 
voting-eligible (as opposed to total) population in each district.  However, these metrics 
are usually highly correlated.   
375 I separately calculated the proportion of majority-minority districts in each state 
legislative chamber, and then averaged the state house and state senate figures to ob-
tain a single value for each state. 
376 Cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 (1994) (evaluating minority repre-
sentation in similar fashion).  I do not claim that the gap should necessarily be zero.  I 
only compare states’ proportions of majority-minority districts to their minority popula-
tion percentages so that I can have a benchmark by which to assess those proportions.  
In addition, my analysis addresses descriptive representation only; it has nothing to say 
about the caliber of minorities’ substantive representation. 
377 The gap increases to 3.2 percentage points if states with less than a 10% minority 
population (in which it is very difficult to draw majority-minority districts) are excluded 
from the analysis.  The gap changes to 2.3 percentage points if median figures are used. 
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large; in fact, it just failed to rise to the level of statistical significance.378  
Nor was any clear pattern discernible in the subcategories of states that 
enforced    community-respect provisions more or less stringently.  Still, 
these results offer no support for the claim that district-community con-
gruence systematically reduces minority representation.  During the last 
redistricting cycle, such congruence had either no link, or a slightly posi-
tive link, with states’ relative proportions of majority-minority districts. 
  
Figure 3:  Average Discrepancy Between Proportion of Majority-
Minority Districts and Minority Population  
Percentage by State Category 
 
3.  Voter Engagement 
Though they are relatively favorable, the implications of the terri-
torial community test for bias, responsiveness, and minority represen-
tation are somewhat fortuitous.  As noted above, the test is not designed 
to make district plans less biased, more responsive, or better for mi-
 
378 The difference was assessed at the 5% significance level. 
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norities.  That it appears to do so, relative to the status quo, is a prod-
uct of the particular political and racial geography of contemporary 
America—as well as an illustration of how flawed the status quo is. 
However, the territorial community test is aimed at making voters 
more invested in the political process and more likely to participate in 
it.  An important prediction of the theory of communal representation 
(discussed above in Part I) is that relations between voters and elected 
officials, as well as voters’ political engagement, should improve when 
districts and communities coincide.379  To assess this prediction, I 
compiled data on voter turnout380 and trust in government381 for all 
available states during the last redistricting cycle.  Turnout is the pro-
portion of the voting-eligible population that casts a ballot in a given 
election.  Trust in government is measured by survey on a scale from 0 
to 100 points. 
As Figures 4 and 5 show, both turnout and trust in government 
were substantially higher in the states that paid heed to community 
boundaries when they last redistricted.  Specifically, average turnout 
was 4.9 percentage points higher (55.5% versus 50.6%), while average 
trust in government was 6.1 points higher (39.3 points versus 33.2 
points).382  All the subcategories of states with community-respect pro-
visions also scored better than the states without them.  The differ-
ences in turnout and trust in government were statistically significant 
as well.383  And adherence to community boundaries remained a signif-
icant predictor of turnout and trust in government even when I con-
trolled for other common redistricting criteria384 and demographic 
 
379 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
380 See Michael McDonald, Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections. 
gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).  I used turnout data for all fifty 
states, for the highest office on the ballot, and from 2002 to 2008, in my analysis. 
381 See Codebook Variable Documentation File, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUD. 616 (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/anes_cdf_var.pdf.  Data was avail-
able for forty-seven states and for the years 2002, 2004, and 2008.  
382 These figures are for mean turnout and trust in government.  Median turnout 
was 6.6 percentage points higher (55.9% versus 49.3%), while median trust in govern-
ment was 5.1 points higher (38.4 points versus 33.3 points). 
383 Differences were assessed at the 5% significance level. 
384 See supra note 370.   
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variables.385  In fact, controlling for all these factors, a shift from no 
community-respect provision to the most stringent enforcement of 
such a provision was associated with a turnout increase of 4.4 percent-
age points and a trust-in-government increase of 6.2 points. 
This analysis indicates that, as predicted by the theory of communal 
representation, the territorial community test is linked to higher voter 
turnout and greater trust in government.  This is a notable finding that 
suggests that voters indeed respond favorably to improved district-
community congruence.  Where districts and communities coincided 
more closely over the last decade, voters were both more likely to go to 
the polls and more trustful of their elected representatives.  Democrat-
ic participation improved, in other words, while the usual electoral 
pathologies were somewhat less virulent.386 
 
  
 
385 The demographic variables for which I controlled were household income, per-
cent of population over 65, percent of population that is black, percent of population 
that is Hispanic, and percent of population with a bachelor’s degree.  I coded them all 
as continuous variables.  I obtained income data from State Median Income, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html (last modi-
fied Nov. 1, 2011); age data from Age Data of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/age-st-cen.html; race data from 
Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census. 
gov/popest/data/state/asrh/2009/SC-EST2009-03.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); 
and education data from SARAH R. CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL AT-
TAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:  2007 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2009pubs/p20-560.pdf.  For regression results, see the Appendix.   
386 See supra note 362 (noting that conclusions would be bolstered by direct analysis 
of district-community congruence); see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript 
at 35-36) (finding that rate of voter roll-off is lower in districts that correspond more 
closely to communities). 
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Figure 4:  Average Voter Turnout by State Category 
 
 
Figure 5:  Average Trust in Government by State Category 
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B.  The Political Science Literature 
The political science literature largely confirms the above findings 
and extends them in several interesting ways.  The literature thus pro-
vides further evidence that the political implications of the territorial 
community test’s adoption would likely be positive. 
1.  Bias and Responsiveness 
To begin with, an array of studies, employing a variety of methods, 
suggest that district-community congruence would give rise to less bi-
ased and more responsive district plans than the status quo.  First, Ro-
land Fryer and Richard Holden recently redrew the congressional 
districts of four large states (California, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas) using an algorithm that minimized the spatial distance between 
voters in each district.387  This redrawing, which the authors analogized 
to reliance on territorial communities,388 resulted in substantially lower 
bias and higher responsiveness scores.  Average bias in the four states 
fell from 4.9% to 2.4%, while average responsiveness doubled from 0.9 
to 1.8.389  In other words, the revised (and more community-attentive) 
district plans were about twice as fair and responsive as the states’ actual 
maps. 
Michael McDonald carried out a similar study for five Midwestern 
states (Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin), redraw-
ing their districts using several different techniques.390  He did not 
calculate bias or responsiveness for his new maps, but, when he min-
imized congressional districts’ splits of Census places (i.e., political 
subdivisions), he found notable improvements in other metrics of 
 
387 See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Richard Holden, Measuring the Compactness of Polit-
ical Districting Plans ( July 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/Compactness%20Final.pdf. 
388 See id. at 2 n.5. 
389 See id. at 51 tbl.2.  But see Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Using Legislative Dis-
tricting Simulations To Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures 6, 14 ( July 15, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/ 
florida.pdf (finding that redrawing Florida districts on basis of compactness would re-
sult in significant pro-Republican bias). 
390 See MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT, available at http:// 
elections.gmu.edu/Midwest_Mapping_Project.pdf. 
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fairness and competitiveness.  In particular, the average proportion of 
Democratic-leaning districts increased from 40% to 49%, and the av-
erage proportion of competitive districts increased from 44% to 
51%.391  While not as reliable as bias and responsiveness calculations, 
these findings also illustrate the potential positive impact of district-
community congruence.392 
So too does recent scholarship on the geographic distribution of 
the major U.S. parties’ supporters, which suggests that the territorial 
community test would be unlikely to produce partisan imbalances.  
Democrats, it turns out, are not more spatially concentrated than Re-
publicans.  Rather, “[b]oth Republicans and Democrats live in coun-
ties where about fifty percent of the voters share their own party,” and 
the “isolation index,” a measure of partisan segregation, is actually 
slightly higher for Republicans than for Democrats.393  Accordingly, 
neither party has much reason to fear that its voters would be particu-
larly “packed” if districts were drawn to better coincide with geographic 
communities. 
The capacity of the territorial community test to curb gerryman-
dering is further confirmed by the strong record of requirements that 
districts adhere to political subdivisions.  One scholar found that high-
ly partisan plans in the 1980s disregarded more subdivision boundaries 
 
391 I calculated these averages myself using the data compiled by McDonald in the 
Midwest Mapping Project. 
392 See also DOUGLAS JOHNSON, THE ROSE INST. OF STATE & LOCAL GOV’T, COMPETI-
TIVE DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA:  A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S REDISTRICTING IN THE 
1990S 7-9 (2005), available at http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rose/publications/ 
pdf/rose_ca_case_study.pdf (finding high level of competitiveness when California’s 
districts were drawn in the 1990s to correspond to geographic communities). 
393 Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political Geog-
raphy 6 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper No. 2100, Nov. 23, 2005), 
available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2006/HIER2100.pdf; see also 
Philip A. Klinkner, Red and Blue Scare:  The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral 
Landscape, 2 FORUM, no. 2, 2004, at 1, 7, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss2/art2 
(finding that “index of exposure” in 2000 was almost identical for Democrats and Re-
publicans, “mean[ing] that the average Democrat and the average Republican lived in 
a county that was close to evenly divided”); cf. MORRILL, supra note 58, at 21 (noting 
that compactness requirement would have random partisan effects because both par-
ties’ supporters are equally spatially concentrated); Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at 
334-35 (same).  
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than bipartisan or nonpartisan plans.394  If district drawers had been 
obligated to follow subdivision lines, many heavily biased plans would 
not have been possible.  Similarly, Jonathan Winburn determined that, 
in a range of states over the last decade, “the principle against splitting 
political subdivisions play[ed] a key function in constraining the re-
mappers from gerrymandering.”395  Where such a provision existed, 
district plans were generally fair to the major parties; where it was ab-
sent, inequitable plans could be (and usually were) implemented.396  
The same would likely be true for a district-community congruence 
requirement. 
Lastly, a number of studies have established that challengers have 
better odds of success in congressional districts that coincide with po-
litical subdivisions or media markets.  The explanation for the im-
provement is that challengers are better able to convey their messages 
(and names) to the public when districts have a cognizable identity 
and media channels are efficiently structured.397  The boost is also sur-
prisingly large.  One study estimated that challengers receive 8% more 
of the vote in high-congruence districts,398 while another study found 
that a challenger is 16% more likely to win a voter’s support if the vot-
er can recall the challenger’s name.399  District-community congruence 
thus not only correlates with, but also helps foster, increased electoral 
competitiveness. 
2.  Minority Representation 
There is less political science literature on the territorial commu-
nity test’s effect on minority representation, but the available studies 
suggest that minorities (just like Democrats) would not end up ineffi-
ciently overconcentrated.  One study examined the relationship be-
 
394 See Morrill, supra note 44, at 225-26. 
395 JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING:  FOLLOWING THE RULES 
AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 9 (2008). 
396 Id. at 200-02.   
397 See GRONKE, supra note 342, at 23, 97; Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 671-73; 
Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 317-19; Niemi et al., supra note 339, at 193; Prinz, 
supra note 342, at 310-12. 
398 Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 673-74. 
399 Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 321-23. 
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tween political subdivision preservation requirements and the num-
bers of majority-minority and minority-influence districts within states.  
The study found that such requirements have no impact on the num-
ber of majority-minority districts in a state, but increase the number of 
minority-influence districts.400  Similarly, another study analyzed how 
often districts with varying proportions of minority voters cross county 
lines.  The study determined that districts with the highest percentages 
of African American and Hispanic voters split counties more frequent-
ly than all other districts.401  As long as political subdivisions are a de-
cent proxy for geographic communities, the upshot of these studies is 
that higher district-community congruence would likely result in more 
minority-influence districts, about the same number of majority-
minority districts, and fewer supermajority-minority (i.e., “packed”) 
districts.  This is not an outcome that should alarm proponents of mi-
nority representation. 
3.  Voter Engagement 
Finally, the political science literature indicates that both voter 
knowledge and voter turnout tend to increase as districts and commu-
nities coincide more closely.  With regard to voter knowledge, a series 
of studies have shown that voters are better informed about politics 
when they live in high-congruence districts.  One study found that vot-
ers in districts that correspond well to media markets are 8% more 
likely to recognize incumbent politicians’ names, and 19% more likely 
to recognize challengers’ names.402  An analogous study determined 
that voters in districts that mirror political subdivisions are 8% more 
 
400 Barabas & Jerit, supra note 362, at 423.  In contrast, compactness requirements 
reduced the numbers of both majority-minority and minority-influence districts.  Id. at 
429; see also Carmen Cirincione et al., Assessing South Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Dis-
tricting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189, 201-02 (2000) (finding that redrawing South Carolina’s 
congressional districts so as to minimize county splits would likely result in one minori-
ty-influence district and no majority-minority districts). 
401 See W. Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting:  An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 193, 207 fig.3 & 208 fig.4 (2001); see also id. at 209-10 (find-
ing strong positive relationship between minority percentage in district and district’s 
proportion of split Census places). 
402 Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 672.  The larger increase for challengers ex-
plains why they do better in high-congruence districts.  See supra notes 397-99 and ac-
companying text. 
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likely to recall incumbents’ names, and 12% more likely to recall chal-
lengers’ names.403  Taking a slightly different tack, another study con-
cluded that voters in high-congruence districts are 14% more likely to 
state correctly their representatives’ votes in Congress than voters in 
low-congruence districts.404   
The story with turnout is similar (though not quite as clear-cut).  
One study found that district congruence with media markets is strongly 
linked to higher turnout, but that district-county congruence has no 
effect on it.405  Another study reported that neither media market nor 
county congruence has a statistically significant impact on turnout.406  
A further study determined that districts that are more compact tend 
to have higher turnout.407  A Canadian study, lastly, concluded that, 
after Ontario’s districts were redrawn in the 1980s, turnout rose in the 
districts that corresponded best to geographic communities, and fell 
in the districts that corresponded worst.408  These results are therefore 
inconclusive, but they do at least hint at a positive relationship be-
tween district-community congruence and voter turnout.  
CONCLUSION 
As the current redistricting cycle continues to unfold, America’s 
courts find themselves in a deeply problematic position.  They are as-
 
403 See Niemi et al., supra note 339, at 192 tbl.1. 
404 Lipinski, supra note 342, at 93; see also VINSON, supra note 342, at 44; Engstrom, 
supra note 340, at 78; Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 319; Prinz, supra note 342, at 
310-12; Schaffner & Sellers, supra note 343, at 52-53; Winburn & Wagner, supra note 
340, at 378.  These quantitative findings are corroborated by the dozens of in-depth 
interviews that Malcolm Jewell conducted with state legislators across the country.  The 
politicians told Jewell that voters are often confused by district lines that disregard 
community boundaries, and that it is difficult for representatives to learn about and 
address their constituents’ problems when districts and communities do not corre-
spond.  See JEWELL, supra note 46, at 55-60, 168. 
405 Engstrom, supra note 340, at 74-75, 77. 
406 Winburn & Wagner, supra note 340, at 382. 
407 Altman, supra note 91, at 333-34. 
408 COURTNEY, supra note 85, at 210-11; see also DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE:  
HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES SHAPE OUR CIVIC LIFE 23-24, 42 (2006) (finding that 
turnout is higher in economically, ethnically, politically, and racially homogeneous 
communities); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 784-
86 (2008) (summarizing political science literature showing that minority turnout is 
higher in majority-minority districts). 
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sured by a unanimous Supreme Court that political gerrymandering 
can sometimes be unconstitutional—but majorities of that same Court 
have also rejected every standard suggested to date for distinguishing 
valid from invalid district plans.  This Article has sought to offer a way 
out of this judicial limbo:  the territorial community test, under which 
courts would assess electoral districts based on how well they corre-
spond to underlying geographic communities.  As the Article has ar-
gued, the test has a robust theoretical and historical pedigree, it 
already animates much of the redistricting case law, it could be admin-
istered capably by the judiciary, and its political implications would be 
quite positive. 
It is true that the territorial community test does not aim directly 
at the heart of what is typically understood today to be the problem 
with political gerrymandering:  the deliberate manipulation of district 
lines in order to help or harm particular parties or candidates.  But 
the test does attack another aspect of gerrymandering that has been 
bemoaned since the days of Elbridge Gerry:  the lack of congruence 
between gerrymandered districts and organic geographic communi-
ties.  The test also does (even though it is not designed to) make elec-
tions fairer for both major parties and more responsive to changes in 
public opinion.  But perhaps the most important point is this:  the Su-
preme Court has already ruled out just about every standard that 
would explicitly tackle partisan unfairness or incumbent entrench-
ment.  At this point, more oblique measures are all that are left.  And 
of these judicial bank shots, there seems to be none more promising 
than the territorial community test.  Second-best may now be the best 
we can do. 
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